12 ideas
| 3570 | Maybe knowledge is belief which 'tracks' the truth [Nozick, by Williams,M] |
| 12580 | Experiences have no conceptual content [Evans, by Greco] |
| 7643 | We have far fewer colour concepts than we have discriminations of colour [Evans] |
| 21500 | We rely on memory for empirical beliefs because they mutually support one another [Lewis,CI] |
| 21501 | If we doubt memories we cannot assess our doubt, or what is being doubted [Lewis,CI] |
| 6556 | If anything is to be probable, then something must be certain [Lewis,CI] |
| 21498 | Congruents assertions increase the probability of each individual assertion in the set [Lewis,CI] |
| 2748 | A true belief isn't knowledge if it would be believed even if false. It should 'track the truth' [Nozick, by Dancy,J] |
| 23794 | Some representational states, like perception, may be nonconceptual [Evans, by Schulte] |
| 5828 | Extension is the class of things, intension is the correct definition of the thing, and intension determines extension [Lewis,CI] |
| 16366 | The Generality Constraint says if you can think a predicate you can apply it to anything [Evans] |
| 12575 | Concepts have a 'Generality Constraint', that we must know how predicates apply to them [Evans, by Peacocke] |