Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Philosophical Explanations', 'The Varieties of Reference' and 'Problems in the Explanation of Action'

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8 ideas

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs

3570	Maybe knowledge is belief which 'tracks' the truth [Nozick, by Williams,M]

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception

12580

Experiences have no conceptual content [Evans, by Greco]

7643	We have far fewer colour concepts than we have discriminations of colour [Evans]

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 4. Tracking the Facts

2748	A true belief isn't knowledge if it would be believed even if false. It should 'track the truth' [Nozick, by Dancy,J]

18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content

23794

Some representational states, like perception, may be nonconceptual [Evans, by Schulte]

18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts

16366

The Generality Constraint says if you can think a predicate you can apply it to anything [Evans]

18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities

12575

Concepts have a 'Generality Constraint', that we must know how predicates apply to them [Evans, by Peacocke]

20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / b. Types of intention

20074

We can keep Davidson's account of intentions in action, by further explaining prior intentions [Davidson, by Stout,R]