26 ideas
18806 | Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt] |
8490 | First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege] |
8492 | Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege] |
17453 | The meaning of a number isn't just the numerals leading up to it [Heck] |
17457 | A basic grasp of cardinal numbers needs an understanding of equinumerosity [Heck] |
17448 | In counting, numerals are used, not mentioned (as objects that have to correlated) [Heck] |
17456 | Counting is the assignment of successively larger cardinal numbers to collections [Heck] |
17455 | Is counting basically mindless, and independent of the cardinality involved? [Heck] |
17450 | Understanding 'just as many' needn't involve grasping one-one correspondence [Heck] |
17451 | We can know 'just as many' without the concepts of equinumerosity or numbers [Heck] |
17459 | Frege's Theorem explains why the numbers satisfy the Peano axioms [Heck] |
17454 | Children can use numbers, without a concept of them as countable objects [Heck] |
8487 | Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege] |
17458 | Equinumerosity is not the same concept as one-one correspondence [Heck] |
17449 | We can understand cardinality without the idea of one-one correspondence [Heck] |
18899 | Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers] |
4028 | Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege] |
8489 | The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege] |
3570 | Maybe knowledge is belief which 'tracks' the truth [Nozick, by Williams,M] |
2748 | A true belief isn't knowledge if it would be believed even if false. It should 'track the truth' [Nozick, by Dancy,J] |
9947 | Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
10319 | An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale] |
8488 | A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege] |
9948 | Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
4972 | I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege] |
8491 | The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege] |