40 ideas
17070 | Coherence is consilience, simplicity, analogy, and fitting into a web of belief [Smart] |
17072 | We need comprehensiveness, as well as self-coherence [Smart] |
18680 | To avoid misunderstandings supervenience is often expressed negatively: no A-change without B-change [Orsi] |
17073 | I simply reject evidence, if it is totally contrary to my web of belief [Smart] |
17077 | The height of a flagpole could be fixed by its angle of shadow, but that would be very unusual [Smart] |
17078 | Universe expansion explains the red shift, but not vice versa [Smart] |
17061 | Explanation of a fact is fitting it into a system of beliefs [Smart] |
17074 | Explanations are bad by fitting badly with a web of beliefs, or fitting well into a bad web [Smart] |
17076 | Deducing from laws is one possible way to achieve a coherent explanation [Smart] |
17071 | An explanation is better if it also explains phenomena from a different field [Smart] |
17062 | If scientific explanation is causal, that rules out mathematical explanation [Smart] |
17075 | Scientific explanation tends to reduce things to the unfamiliar (not the familiar) [Smart] |
18684 | Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it [Orsi] |
18666 | Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi] |
18667 | The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi] |
18685 | Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi] |
18679 | Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi] |
18682 | A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi] |
18683 | Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi] |
18686 | The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi] |
18672 | Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi] |
18648 | Freedom to live according to our own conception of the good is the ultimate value [Nozick, by Kymlicka] |
18677 | A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi] |
18668 | Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi] |
18670 | The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi] |
18669 | Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi] |
20585 | If an experience machine gives you any experience you want, should you hook up for life? [Nozick] |
18643 | A minimal state should protect, but a state forcing us to do more is unjustified [Nozick] |
18642 | Individual rights are so strong that the state and its officials must be very limited in power [Nozick] |
18644 | States can't enforce mutual aid on citizens, or interfere for their own good [Nozick] |
22661 | My Anarchy, State and Utopia neglected our formal social ties and concerns [Nozick on Nozick] |
18641 | If people hold things legitimately, just distribution is simply the result of free exchanges [Nozick, by Kymlicka] |
20539 | Property is legitimate by initial acquisition, voluntary transfer, or rectification of injustice [Nozick, by Swift] |
18645 | Nozick assumes initial holdings include property rights, but we can challenge that [Kymlicka on Nozick] |
20521 | Can I come to own the sea, by mixing my private tomato juice with it? [Nozick] |
18646 | How did the private property get started? If violence was involved, we can redistribute it [Kymlicka on Nozick] |
18647 | If property is only initially acquired by denying the rights of others, Nozick can't get started [Kymlicka on Nozick] |
21737 | Unowned things may be permanently acquired, if it doesn't worsen the position of other people [Nozick] |
21738 | Maybe land was originally collectively owned, rather than unowned? [Cohen,GA on Nozick] |
17063 | Unlike Newton, Einstein's general theory explains the perihelion of Mercury [Smart] |