Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Philosophical Explanations', 'Positions' and 'Ontological Categories'

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18 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 6. Deconstruction
Deconstruction is not neutral; it intervenes [Derrida]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
I try to analyse certain verbal concepts which block and confuse the dialectical process [Derrida]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
We negate predicates but do not negate names [Westerhoff]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
Categories can be ordered by both containment and generality [Westerhoff]
How far down before we are too specialised to have a category? [Westerhoff]
Maybe objects in the same category have the same criteria of identity [Westerhoff]
Categories are base-sets which are used to construct states of affairs [Westerhoff]
Categories are held to explain why some substitutions give falsehood, and others meaninglessness [Westerhoff]
Categories systematize our intuitions about generality, substitutability, and identity [Westerhoff]
Categories as generalities don't give a criterion for a low-level cut-off point [Westerhoff]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
The aim is that everything should belong in some ontological category or other [Westerhoff]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
All systems have properties and relations, and most have individuals, abstracta, sets and events [Westerhoff]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
Ontological categories are like formal axioms, not unique and with necessary membership [Westerhoff]
Categories merely systematise, and are not intrinsic to objects [Westerhoff]
A thing's ontological category depends on what else exists, so it is contingent [Westerhoff]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Essential kinds may be too specific to provide ontological categories [Westerhoff]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
Maybe knowledge is belief which 'tracks' the truth [Nozick, by Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 4. Tracking the Facts
A true belief isn't knowledge if it would be believed even if false. It should 'track the truth' [Nozick, by Dancy,J]