15 ideas
10061 | The If-thenist view only seems to work for the axiomatised portions of mathematics [Musgrave] |
10065 | Perhaps If-thenism survives in mathematics if we stick to first-order logic [Musgrave] |
10050 | A statement is logically true if it comes out true in all interpretations in all (non-empty) domains [Musgrave] |
10049 | Logical truths may contain non-logical notions, as in 'all men are men' [Musgrave] |
12154 | Are 'word token' and 'word type' different sorts of countable objects, or two ways of counting? [Geach, by Perry] |
10058 | No two numbers having the same successor relies on the Axiom of Infinity [Musgrave] |
10063 | Formalism is a bulwark of logical positivism [Musgrave] |
10062 | Formalism seems to exclude all creative, growing mathematics [Musgrave] |
8969 | We should abandon absolute identity, confining it to within some category [Geach, by Hawthorne] |
16075 | Denial of absolute identity has drastic implications for logic, semantics and set theory [Wasserman on Geach] |
12152 | Identity is relative. One must not say things are 'the same', but 'the same A as' [Geach] |
16073 | Leibniz's Law is incomplete, since it includes a non-relativized identity predicate [Geach, by Wasserman] |
3570 | Maybe knowledge is belief which 'tracks' the truth [Nozick, by Williams,M] |
2748 | A true belief isn't knowledge if it would be believed even if false. It should 'track the truth' [Nozick, by Dancy,J] |
10060 | Logical positivists adopted an If-thenist version of logicism about numbers [Musgrave] |