Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Philosophical Explanations', 'Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology' and 'Aristotle's Theory of Substance'

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19 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
18877 Moral realism doesn't seem to entail the existence of any things [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
18868 Surely if some propositions are grounded in existence, they all are? [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
18867 Orthodox Truthmaker applies to all propositions, and necessitates their truth [Cameron]
18873 God fixes all the truths of the world by fixing what exists [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
18879 What the proposition says may not be its truthmaker [Cameron]
18880 Rather than what exists, some claim that the truthmakers are ways of existence, dispositions, modalities etc [Cameron]
18874 Truthmaking doesn't require realism, because we can be anti-realist about truthmakers [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
18869 Without truthmakers, negative truths must be ungrounded [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
18871 I support the correspondence theory because I believe in truthmakers [Cameron]
18870 Maybe truthmaking and correspondence stand together, and are interdefinable [Cameron]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
18881 For realists it is analytic that truths are grounded in the world [Cameron]
18875 Realism says a discourse is true or false, and some of it is true [Cameron]
18878 Realism says truths rest on mind-independent reality; truthmaking theories are about which features [Cameron]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
12354 A 'categorial' property is had by virtue of being or having an item from a category [Wedin]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
12358 Substance is a principle and a kind of cause [Wedin]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
12346 Form explains why some matter is of a certain kind, and that is explanatory bedrock [Wedin]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
18872 We should reject distinct but indiscernible worlds [Cameron]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
3570 Maybe knowledge is belief which 'tracks' the truth [Nozick, by Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 4. Tracking the Facts
2748 A true belief isn't knowledge if it would be believed even if false. It should 'track the truth' [Nozick, by Dancy,J]