20 ideas
19426 | 'Nominal' definitions just list distinguishing characteristics [Leibniz] |
17000 | We might fix identities for small particulars, but it is utopian to hope for such things [Kripke] |
11868 | A different piece of wood could have been used for that table; constitution isn't identity [Wiggins on Kripke] |
17044 | A relation can clearly be reflexive, and identity is the smallest reflexive relation [Kripke] |
16999 | A vague identity may seem intransitive, and we might want to talk of 'counterparts' [Kripke] |
17058 | What many people consider merely physically necessary I consider completely necessary [Kripke] |
4970 | What is often held to be mere physical necessity is actually metaphysical necessity [Kripke] |
17059 | Unicorns are vague, so no actual or possible creature could count as a unicorn [Kripke] |
4950 | Possible worlds are useful in set theory, but can be very misleading elsewhere [Kripke] |
17003 | Kaplan's 'Dthat' is a useful operator for transforming a description into a rigid designation [Kripke] |
9221 | The best known objection to counterparts is Kripke's, that Humphrey doesn't care if his counterpart wins [Kripke, by Sider] |
19424 | Knowledge needs clarity, distinctness, and adequacy, and it should be intuitive [Leibniz] |
3570 | Maybe knowledge is belief which 'tracks' the truth [Nozick, by Williams,M] |
17052 | The a priori analytic truths involving fixing of reference are contingent [Kripke] |
2748 | A true belief isn't knowledge if it would be believed even if false. It should 'track the truth' [Nozick, by Dancy,J] |
4969 | I regard the mind-body problem as wide open, and extremely confusing [Kripke] |
19427 | True ideas represent what is possible; false ideas represent contradictions [Leibniz] |
4956 | A description may fix a reference even when it is not true of its object [Kripke] |
17032 | Even if Gödel didn't produce his theorems, he's still called 'Gödel' [Kripke] |
19425 | In the schools the Four Causes are just lumped together in a very obscure way [Leibniz] |