Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Philosophical Explanations', 'Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo' and 'Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority'

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26 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
1848 We are coerced into assent to a truth by reason's violence [Aquinas]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
1858 The mind is compelled by necessary truths, but not by contingent truths [Aquinas]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
9331 How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
1852 For the mind Good is one truth among many, and Truth is one good among many [Aquinas]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
3570 Maybe knowledge is belief which 'tracks' the truth [Nozick, by Williams,M]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
9333 A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
9342 Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
9332 Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
9341 Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich]
9334 If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
9339 A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
1860 Knowledge may be based on senses, but we needn't sense all our knowledge [Aquinas]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 4. Tracking the Facts
2748 A true belief isn't knowledge if it would be believed even if false. It should 'track the truth' [Nozick, by Dancy,J]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 3. Constraints on the will
1855 If we saw something as totally and utterly good, we would be compelled to will it [Aquinas]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
1861 The will is not compelled to move, even if pleasant things are set before it [Aquinas]
1853 Because the will moves by examining alternatives, it doesn't compel itself to will [Aquinas]
1849 Since will is a reasoning power, it can entertain opposites, so it is not compelled to embrace one of them [Aquinas]
1856 Nothing can be willed except what is good, but good is very varied, and so choices are unpredictable [Aquinas]
1862 However habituated you are, given time to ponder you can go against a habit [Aquinas]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
1854 We must admit that when the will is not willing something, the first movement to will must come from outside the will [Aquinas]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
1857 We don't have to will even perfect good, because we can choose not to think of it [Aquinas]
1846 The will can only want what it thinks is good [Aquinas]
1847 The will must aim at happiness, but can choose the means [Aquinas]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
1850 Without free will not only is ethical action meaningless, but also planning, commanding, praising and blaming [Aquinas]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
1851 Good applies to goals, just as truth applies to ideas in the mind [Aquinas]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
1859 Even a sufficient cause doesn't compel its effect, because interference could interrupt the process [Aquinas]