107 ideas
16604 | Philosophy consists of choosing between Plato, Aristotle and Democritus [Pasnau] |
16606 | Original philosophers invariably seek inspiration from past thinkers [Pasnau] |
16586 | The commentaries of Averroes were the leading guide to Aristotle [Pasnau] |
16568 | Modernity begins in the late 12th century, with Averroes's commentaries on Aristotle [Pasnau] |
16653 | Once accidents were seen as real, 'Categories' became the major text for ontology [Pasnau] |
16704 | In 1347, the Church effectively stopped philosophy for the next 300 years [Pasnau] |
16605 | After c.1450 all of Plato was available. Before that, only the first half of 'Timaeus' was known [Pasnau] |
16607 | Renaissance Platonism is peripheral [Pasnau] |
16715 | Plato only made an impact locally in 15th century Italy [Pasnau] |
16610 | Philosophy could easily have died in 17th century, if it weren't for Descartes [Pasnau] |
16781 | The 17th century is a metaphysical train wreck [Pasnau] |
16677 | Anti-Razor: if you can't account for a truth, keep positing things until you can [Pasnau] |
8625 | What physical facts could underlie 0 or 1, or very large numbers? [Frege on Mill] |
17895 | Combining two distinct assertions does not necessarily lead to a single 'complex proposition' [Mill] |
10427 | All names are names of something, real or imaginary [Mill] |
4944 | Mill says names have denotation but not connotation [Mill, by Kripke] |
7762 | Proper names are just labels for persons or objects, and the meaning is the object [Mill, by Lycan] |
9801 | Numbers must be assumed to have identical units, as horses are equalised in 'horse-power' [Mill] |
8742 | The only axioms needed are for equality, addition, and successive numbers [Mill, by Shapiro] |
9800 | Arithmetic is based on definitions, and Sums of equals are equal, and Differences of equals are equal [Mill] |
5201 | Mill says logic and maths is induction based on a very large number of instances [Mill, by Ayer] |
9360 | If two black and two white objects in practice produced five, what colour is the fifth one? [Lewis,CI on Mill] |
9888 | Mill mistakes particular applications as integral to arithmetic, instead of general patterns [Dummett on Mill] |
9794 | There are no such things as numbers in the abstract [Mill] |
9796 | Things possess the properties of numbers, as quantity, and as countable parts [Mill] |
9795 | Numbers have generalised application to entities (such as bodies or sounds) [Mill] |
9798 | Different parcels made from three pebbles produce different actual sensations [Mill] |
9797 | '2 pebbles and 1 pebble' and '3 pebbles' name the same aggregation, but different facts [Mill] |
9799 | 3=2+1 presupposes collections of objects ('Threes'), which may be divided thus [Mill] |
9802 | Numbers denote physical properties of physical phenomena [Mill] |
9803 | We can't easily distinguish 102 horses from 103, but we could arrange them to make it obvious [Mill] |
9804 | Arithmetical results give a mode of formation of a given number [Mill] |
9805 | 12 is the cube of 1728 means pebbles can be aggregated a certain way [Mill] |
8741 | Numbers must be of something; they don't exist as abstractions [Mill] |
12411 | Mill is too imprecise, and is restricted to simple arithmetic [Kitcher on Mill] |
5656 | Empirical theories of arithmetic ignore zero, limit our maths, and need probability to get started [Frege on Mill] |
9624 | Numbers are a very general property of objects [Mill, by Brown,JR] |
16598 | Priority was a major topic of dispute for scholastics [Pasnau] |
16727 | In mixtures, the four elements ceased to exist, replaced by a mixed body with a form [Pasnau] |
16732 | 17th C qualities are either microphysical, or phenomenal, or powers [Pasnau] |
16733 | 17th century authors only recognised categorical properties, never dispositions [Pasnau] |
16662 | The biggest question for scholastics is whether properties are real, or modes of substances [Pasnau] |
16767 | There is no centralised power, but we still need essence for a metaphysical understanding [Pasnau] |
16788 | Instead of adding Aristotelian forms to physical stuff, one could add dispositions [Pasnau] |
16738 | Scholastics reject dispositions, because they are not actual, as forms require [Pasnau] |
16649 | Scholastics say there is a genuine thing if it is 'separable' [Pasnau] |
16785 | If you reject essences, questions of individuation become extremely difficult [Pasnau] |
16680 | Scholastics thought Quantity could be the principle of individuation [Pasnau] |
16628 | Corpuscularianism promised a decent account of substance [Pasnau] |
16617 | Corpuscularian critics of scholasticism say only substances exist [Pasnau] |
16741 | Scholastics wanted to treat Aristotelianism as physics, rather than as metaphysics [Pasnau] |
16777 | If crowds are things at all, they seem to be Substances, since they bear properties [Pasnau] |
16615 | Scholastics use 'substantia' for thick concrete entities, and for thin metaphysical ones [Pasnau] |
16775 | For corpuscularians, a substance is just its integral parts [Pasnau] |
16769 | If clay survives destruction of the statue, the statue wasn't a substance, but a mere accident [Pasnau] |
16602 | Corpuscularianism rejected not only form, but also the dependence of matter on form [Pasnau] |
16612 | Hylomorphism may not be a rival to science, but an abstract account of unity and endurance [Pasnau] |
16613 | Hylomorphism declined because scholastics made it into a testable physical theory [Pasnau] |
16747 | Scholastics made forms substantial, in a way unintended by Aristotle [Pasnau] |
16759 | Scholastics began to see substantial form more as Aristotle's 'efficient' cause [Pasnau] |
16748 | Aquinas says a substance has one form; Scotists say it has many forms [Pasnau] |
16671 | Scholastic Quantity either gives a body parts, or spreads them out in a unified way [Pasnau] |
16579 | There may be different types of substrate, or temporary substrates [Pasnau] |
16596 | A substratum can't be 'bare', because it has a job to do [Pasnau] |
16584 | If a substrate gives causal support for change, quite a lot of the ingredients must endure [Pasnau] |
16580 | A substrate may be 'prime matter', which endures through every change [Pasnau] |
9806 | Whatever is made up of parts is made up of parts of those parts [Mill] |
11156 | The essence is that without which a thing can neither be, nor be conceived to be [Mill] |
16749 | Aristotelians deny that all necessary properties are essential [Pasnau] |
16694 | Typical successive things are time and motion [Pasnau] |
16583 | Weak ex nihilo says it all comes from something; strong version says the old must partly endure [Pasnau] |
12190 | Necessity is what will be, despite any alternative suppositions whatever [Mill] |
22623 | Necessity can only mean what must be, without conditions of any kind [Mill] |
16859 | Most perception is one-tenth observation and nine-tenths inference [Mill] |
9082 | Clear concepts result from good observation, extensive experience, and accurate memory [Mill] |
19555 | People begin to doubt whether they 'know' when the answer becomes more significant [Conee] |
19557 | Maybe low knowledge standards are loose talk; people will deny that it is 'really and truly' knowledge [Conee] |
19556 | Maybe knowledge has fixed standards (high, but attainable), although people apply contextual standards [Conee] |
16860 | Inductive generalisation is more reliable than one of its instances; they can't all be wrong [Mill] |
16845 | The whole theory of induction rests on causes [Mill] |
16843 | Mill's methods (Difference,Agreement,Residues,Concomitance,Hypothesis) don't nail induction [Mill, by Lipton] |
17086 | Surprisingly, empiricists before Mill ignore explanation, which seems to transcend experience [Mill, by Ruben] |
17091 | Explanation is fitting of facts into ever more general patterns of regularity [Mill, by Ruben] |
16805 | Causal inference is by spotting either Agreements or Differences [Mill, by Lipton] |
16783 | Essences must explain, so we can infer them causally from the accidents [Pasnau] |
16835 | The Methods of Difference and of Agreement are forms of inference to the best explanation [Mill, by Lipton] |
9079 | We can focus our minds on what is common to a whole class, neglecting other aspects [Mill] |
9081 | We don't recognise comparisons by something in our minds; the concepts result from the comparisons [Mill] |
9080 | General conceptions are a necessary preliminary to Induction [Mill] |
9078 | The study of the nature of Abstract Ideas does not belong to logic, but to a different science [Mill] |
16609 | Atomists say causation is mechanical collisions, and all true qualities are microscopic [Pasnau] |
16603 | In the 17th C matter became body, and was then studied by science [Pasnau] |
16592 | Atomism is the commonest version of corpuscularianism, but isn't required by it [Pasnau] |
16750 | If there are just arrangements of corpuscles, where are the boundaries between substances? [Pasnau] |
16722 | Scholastic causation is by changes in the primary qualities of hot, cold, wet, dry [Pasnau] |
8345 | A cause is the total of all the conditions which inevitably produce the result [Mill] |
10391 | Causes and conditions are not distinct, because we select capriciously from among them [Mill] |
14547 | The strict cause is the total positive and negative conditions which ensure the consequent [Mill] |
8377 | Causation is just invariability of succession between every natural fact and a preceding fact [Mill] |
14545 | A cause is an antecedent which invariably and unconditionally leads to a phenomenon [Mill] |
4773 | Mill's regularity theory of causation is based on an effect preceded by a conjunction of causes [Mill, by Psillos] |
4775 | In Mill's 'Method of Agreement' cause is the common factor in a range of different cases [Mill, by Psillos] |
4776 | In Mill's 'Method of Difference' the cause is what stops the effect when it is removed [Mill, by Psillos] |
9417 | What are the fewest propositions from which all natural uniformities could be inferred? [Mill] |
16760 | Substantial forms were a step towards scientific essentialism [Pasnau] |
16581 | Scholastic authors agree that matter was created by God, out of nothing [Pasnau] |
16642 | Transubstantion says accidents of bread and wine don't inhere in the substance [Pasnau] |