156 ideas
| 16604 | Philosophy consists of choosing between Plato, Aristotle and Democritus [Pasnau] |
| 16606 | Original philosophers invariably seek inspiration from past thinkers [Pasnau] |
| 16586 | The commentaries of Averroes were the leading guide to Aristotle [Pasnau] |
| 16568 | Modernity begins in the late 12th century, with Averroes's commentaries on Aristotle [Pasnau] |
| 16653 | Once accidents were seen as real, 'Categories' became the major text for ontology [Pasnau] |
| 16704 | In 1347, the Church effectively stopped philosophy for the next 300 years [Pasnau] |
| 16605 | After c.1450 all of Plato was available. Before that, only the first half of 'Timaeus' was known [Pasnau] |
| 16607 | Renaissance Platonism is peripheral [Pasnau] |
| 16715 | Plato only made an impact locally in 15th century Italy [Pasnau] |
| 16610 | Philosophy could easily have died in 17th century, if it weren't for Descartes [Pasnau] |
| 16781 | The 17th century is a metaphysical train wreck [Pasnau] |
| 5361 | Philosophers must get used to absurdities [Russell] |
| 5368 | Philosophy verifies that our hierarchy of instinctive beliefs is harmonious and consistent [Russell] |
| 5432 | Metaphysics cannot give knowledge of the universe as a whole [Russell] |
| 5434 | Philosophy is similar to science, and has no special source of wisdom [Russell] |
| 5396 | Three Laws of Thought: identity, contradiction, and excluded middle [Russell] |
| 5405 | The law of contradiction is not a 'law of thought', but a belief about things [Russell] |
| 16677 | Anti-Razor: if you can't account for a truth, keep positing things until you can [Pasnau] |
| 5420 | Truth is a property of a belief, but dependent on its external relations, not its internal qualities [Russell] |
| 5419 | Truth and falsehood are properties of beliefs and statements [Russell] |
| 5417 | A good theory of truth must make falsehood possible [Russell] |
| 15063 | Some sentences depend for their truth on worldly circumstances, and others do not [Fine,K] |
| 7395 | Truth as congruence may work for complex beliefs, but not for simple beliefs about existence [Joslin on Russell] |
| 5428 | Beliefs are true if they have corresponding facts, and false if they don't [Russell] |
| 5421 | The coherence theory says falsehood is failure to cohere, and truth is fitting into a complete system of Truth [Russell] |
| 5422 | More than one coherent body of beliefs seems possible [Russell] |
| 5423 | If we suspend the law of contradiction, nothing will appear to be incoherent [Russell] |
| 5424 | Coherence is not the meaning of truth, but an important test for truth [Russell] |
| 5401 | The mortality of Socrates is more certain from induction than it is from deduction [Russell] |
| 5395 | Demonstration always relies on the rule that anything implied by a truth is true [Russell] |
| 5386 | Proper names are really descriptions, and can be replaced by a description in a person's mind [Russell] |
| 5385 | The phrase 'a so-and-so' is an 'ambiguous' description'; 'the so-and-so' (singular) is a 'definite' description [Russell] |
| 5399 | Maths is not known by induction, because further instances are not needed to support it [Russell] |
| 15078 | There are levels of existence, as well as reality; objects exist at the lowest level in which they can function [Fine,K] |
| 16598 | Priority was a major topic of dispute for scholastics [Pasnau] |
| 16727 | In mixtures, the four elements ceased to exist, replaced by a mixed body with a form [Pasnau] |
| 5370 | Space is neutral between touch and sight, so it cannot really be either of them [Russell] |
| 15072 | Bottom level facts are subject to time and world, middle to world but not time, and top to neither [Fine,K] |
| 15071 | Tensed and tenseless sentences state two sorts of fact, which belong to two different 'realms' of reality [Fine,K] |
| 5418 | In a world of mere matter there might be 'facts', but no truths [Russell] |
| 5371 | Because we depend on correspondence, we know relations better than we know the items that relate [Russell] |
| 5407 | That Edinburgh is north of London is a non-mental fact, so relations are independent universals [Russell] |
| 16732 | 17th C qualities are either microphysical, or phenomenal, or powers [Pasnau] |
| 16733 | 17th century authors only recognised categorical properties, never dispositions [Pasnau] |
| 16662 | The biggest question for scholastics is whether properties are real, or modes of substances [Pasnau] |
| 16767 | There is no centralised power, but we still need essence for a metaphysical understanding [Pasnau] |
| 16788 | Instead of adding Aristotelian forms to physical stuff, one could add dispositions [Pasnau] |
| 16738 | Scholastics reject dispositions, because they are not actual, as forms require [Pasnau] |
| 5383 | Every complete sentence must contain at least one word (a verb) which stands for a universal [Russell] |
| 4428 | Propositions express relations (prepositions and verbs) as well as properties (nouns and adjectives) [Russell] |
| 5406 | Confused views of reality result from thinking that only nouns and adjectives represent universals [Russell] |
| 4479 | All universals are like the relation "is north of", in having no physical location at all [Russell, by Loux] |
| 4427 | Every sentence contains at least one word denoting a universal, so we need universals to know truth [Russell] |
| 4030 | Russell claims that universals are needed to explain a priori knowledge (as their relations) [Russell, by Mellor/Oliver] |
| 5409 | Normal existence is in time, so we must say that universals 'subsist' [Russell] |
| 5408 | If we identify whiteness with a thought, we can never think of it twice; whiteness is the object of a thought [Russell] |
| 4441 | 'Resemblance Nominalism' won't work, because the theory treats resemblance itself as a universal [Russell] |
| 4429 | If we consider whiteness to be merely a mental 'idea', we rob it of its universality [Russell] |
| 16649 | Scholastics say there is a genuine thing if it is 'separable' [Pasnau] |
| 16785 | If you reject essences, questions of individuation become extremely difficult [Pasnau] |
| 16680 | Scholastics thought Quantity could be the principle of individuation [Pasnau] |
| 15075 | Modal features are not part of entities, because they are accounted for by the entity [Fine,K] |
| 16617 | Corpuscularian critics of scholasticism say only substances exist [Pasnau] |
| 16741 | Scholastics wanted to treat Aristotelianism as physics, rather than as metaphysics [Pasnau] |
| 16777 | If crowds are things at all, they seem to be Substances, since they bear properties [Pasnau] |
| 16628 | Corpuscularianism promised a decent account of substance [Pasnau] |
| 16615 | Scholastics use 'substantia' for thick concrete entities, and for thin metaphysical ones [Pasnau] |
| 16775 | For corpuscularians, a substance is just its integral parts [Pasnau] |
| 16769 | If clay survives destruction of the statue, the statue wasn't a substance, but a mere accident [Pasnau] |
| 16602 | Corpuscularianism rejected not only form, but also the dependence of matter on form [Pasnau] |
| 16612 | Hylomorphism may not be a rival to science, but an abstract account of unity and endurance [Pasnau] |
| 16613 | Hylomorphism declined because scholastics made it into a testable physical theory [Pasnau] |
| 16747 | Scholastics made forms substantial, in a way unintended by Aristotle [Pasnau] |
| 16759 | Scholastics began to see substantial form more as Aristotle's 'efficient' cause [Pasnau] |
| 16748 | Aquinas says a substance has one form; Scotists say it has many forms [Pasnau] |
| 16671 | Scholastic Quantity either gives a body parts, or spreads them out in a unified way [Pasnau] |
| 16579 | There may be different types of substrate, or temporary substrates [Pasnau] |
| 16596 | A substratum can't be 'bare', because it has a job to do [Pasnau] |
| 16584 | If a substrate gives causal support for change, quite a lot of the ingredients must endure [Pasnau] |
| 16580 | A substrate may be 'prime matter', which endures through every change [Pasnau] |
| 15065 | What it is is fixed prior to existence or the object's worldly features [Fine,K] |
| 16749 | Aristotelians deny that all necessary properties are essential [Pasnau] |
| 15076 | Essential features of an object have no relation to how things actually are [Fine,K] |
| 16694 | Typical successive things are time and motion [Pasnau] |
| 16583 | Weak ex nihilo says it all comes from something; strong version says the old must partly endure [Pasnau] |
| 15073 | Self-identity should have two components, its existence, and its neutral identity with itself [Fine,K] |
| 15074 | We would understand identity between objects, even if their existence was impossible [Fine,K] |
| 15064 | Proper necessary truths hold whatever the circumstances; transcendent truths regardless of circumstances [Fine,K] |
| 15070 | It is the nature of Socrates to be a man, so necessarily he is a man [Fine,K] |
| 5400 | In any possible world we feel that two and two would be four [Russell] |
| 15069 | Possible worlds may be more limited, to how things might actually turn out [Fine,K] |
| 15068 | The actual world is a totality of facts, so we also think of possible worlds as totalities [Fine,K] |
| 5431 | Knowledge cannot be precisely defined, as it merges into 'probable opinion' [Russell] |
| 5426 | Belief relates a mind to several things other than itself [Russell] |
| 5366 | We have an 'instinctive' belief in the external world, prior to all reflection [Russell] |
| 5359 | Descartes showed that subjective things are the most certain [Russell] |
| 5377 | 'Acquaintance' is direct awareness, without inferences or judgements [Russell] |
| 6510 | Russell (1912) said phenomena only resemble reality in abstract structure [Russell, by Robinson,H] |
| 5372 | There is no reason to think that objects have colours [Russell] |
| 5373 | 'Idealism' says that everything which exists is in some sense mental [Russell] |
| 5362 | It is not illogical to think that only myself and my mental events exist [Russell] |
| 5412 | Some propositions are self-evident, but their implications may also be self-evident [Russell] |
| 5413 | Particular instances are more clearly self-evident than any general principles [Russell] |
| 5415 | As shown by memory, self-evidence comes in degrees [Russell] |
| 5416 | If self-evidence has degrees, we should accept the more self-evident as correct [Russell] |
| 5397 | The rationalists were right, because we know logical principles without experience [Russell] |
| 4430 | All a priori knowledge deals with the relations of universals [Russell] |
| 5411 | We can know some general propositions by universals, when no instance can be given [Russell] |
| 6514 | Russell's representationalism says primary qualities only show the structure of reality [Russell, by Robinson,H] |
| 6415 | After 1912, Russell said sense-data are last in analysis, not first in experience [Russell, by Grayling] |
| 5358 | 'Sense-data' are what are immediately known in sensation, such as colours or roughnesses [Russell] |
| 7290 | If Russell rejects innate ideas and direct a priori knowledge, he is left with a tabula rasa [Russell, by Thompson] |
| 5357 | It is natural to begin from experience, and presumably that is the basis of knowledge [Russell] |
| 5382 | We are acquainted with outer and inner sensation, memory, Self, and universals [Russell, by PG] |
| 5389 | Knowledge by descriptions enables us to transcend private experience [Russell] |
| 5376 | I can know the existence of something with which nobody is acquainted [Russell] |
| 5414 | Images are not memory, because they are present, and memories are of the past [Russell] |
| 5430 | A true belief is not knowledge if it is reached by bad reasoning [Russell] |
| 5429 | True belief is not knowledge when it is deduced from false belief [Russell] |
| 5378 | All knowledge (of things and of truths) rests on the foundations of acquaintance [Russell] |
| 5365 | Dreams can be explained fairly scientifically if we assume a physical world [Russell] |
| 5391 | Science aims to find uniformities to which (within the limits of experience) there are no exceptions [Russell] |
| 5394 | We can't prove induction from experience without begging the question [Russell] |
| 5390 | Chickens are not very good at induction, and are surprised when their feeder wrings their neck [Russell] |
| 5392 | It doesn't follow that because the future has always resembled the past, that it always will [Russell] |
| 16783 | Essences must explain, so we can infer them causally from the accidents [Pasnau] |
| 5363 | If the cat reappears in a new position, presumably it has passed through the intermediate positions [Russell] |
| 5367 | Belief in real objects makes our account of experience simpler and more systematic [Russell] |
| 5364 | It is hard not to believe that speaking humans are expressing thoughts, just as we do ourselves [Russell] |
| 5379 | If we didn't know our own minds by introspection, we couldn't know that other people have minds [Russell] |
| 5410 | I learn the universal 'resemblance' by seeing two shades of green, and their contrast with red [Russell] |
| 5381 | In seeing the sun, we are acquainted with our self, but not as a permanent person [Russell] |
| 5380 | In perceiving the sun, I am aware of sun sense-data, and of the perceiver of the data [Russell] |
| 5369 | It is rational to believe in reality, despite the lack of demonstrative reasons for it [Russell] |
| 5375 | Knowledge of truths applies to judgements; knowledge by acquaintance applies to sensations and things [Russell] |
| 21711 | Russell's 'multiple relations' theory says beliefs attach to ingredients, not to propositions [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
| 5427 | Truth is when a mental state corresponds to a complex unity of external constituents [Russell] |
| 5425 | In order to explain falsehood, a belief must involve several terms, not two [Russell] |
| 5384 | A universal of which we are aware is called a 'concept' [Russell] |
| 13468 | Russell started philosophy of language, by declaring some plausible sentences to be meaningless [Russell, by Hart,WD] |
| 5388 | Every understood proposition is composed of constituents with which we are acquainted [Russell] |
| 5387 | It is pure chance which descriptions in a person's mind make a name apply to an individual [Russell] |
| 21724 | The main aim of the multiple relations theory of judgement was to dispense with propositions [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
| 5398 | Judgements of usefulness depend on judgements of value [Russell] |
| 16609 | Atomists say causation is mechanical collisions, and all true qualities are microscopic [Pasnau] |
| 16603 | In the 17th C matter became body, and was then studied by science [Pasnau] |
| 16592 | Atomism is the commonest version of corpuscularianism, but isn't required by it [Pasnau] |
| 16750 | If there are just arrangements of corpuscles, where are the boundaries between substances? [Pasnau] |
| 16722 | Scholastic causation is by changes in the primary qualities of hot, cold, wet, dry [Pasnau] |
| 16760 | Substantial forms were a step towards scientific essentialism [Pasnau] |
| 5393 | We can't know that our laws are exceptionless, or even that there are any laws [Russell] |
| 15077 | It is said that in the A-theory, all existents and objects must be tensed, as well as the sentences [Fine,K] |
| 15067 | A-theorists tend to reject the tensed/tenseless distinction [Fine,K] |
| 15066 | B-theorists say tensed sentences have an unfilled argument-place for a time [Fine,K] |
| 16581 | Scholastic authors agree that matter was created by God, out of nothing [Pasnau] |
| 16642 | Transubstantion says accidents of bread and wine don't inhere in the substance [Pasnau] |