126 ideas
16604 | Philosophy consists of choosing between Plato, Aristotle and Democritus [Pasnau] |
16606 | Original philosophers invariably seek inspiration from past thinkers [Pasnau] |
16586 | The commentaries of Averroes were the leading guide to Aristotle [Pasnau] |
16568 | Modernity begins in the late 12th century, with Averroes's commentaries on Aristotle [Pasnau] |
16653 | Once accidents were seen as real, 'Categories' became the major text for ontology [Pasnau] |
16704 | In 1347, the Church effectively stopped philosophy for the next 300 years [Pasnau] |
16605 | After c.1450 all of Plato was available. Before that, only the first half of 'Timaeus' was known [Pasnau] |
16607 | Renaissance Platonism is peripheral [Pasnau] |
16715 | Plato only made an impact locally in 15th century Italy [Pasnau] |
16610 | Philosophy could easily have died in 17th century, if it weren't for Descartes [Pasnau] |
16781 | The 17th century is a metaphysical train wreck [Pasnau] |
16677 | Anti-Razor: if you can't account for a truth, keep positing things until you can [Pasnau] |
8166 | Truth is part of semantics, since valid inference preserves truth [Dummett] |
9535 | 'Contradictory' propositions always differ in truth-value [Lemmon] |
9509 | That proposition that both P and Q is their 'conjunction', written P∧Q [Lemmon] |
9508 | The sign |- may be read as 'therefore' [Lemmon] |
9511 | We write the conditional 'if P (antecedent) then Q (consequent)' as P→Q [Lemmon] |
9510 | That proposition that either P or Q is their 'disjunction', written P∨Q [Lemmon] |
9512 | We write the 'negation' of P (not-P) as ¬ [Lemmon] |
9513 | We write 'P if and only if Q' as P↔Q; it is also P iff Q, or (P→Q)∧(Q→P) [Lemmon] |
9514 | If A and B are 'interderivable' from one another we may write A -||- B [Lemmon] |
9516 | A 'well-formed formula' follows the rules for variables, ¬, →, ∧, ∨, and ↔ [Lemmon] |
9517 | The 'scope' of a connective is the connective, the linked formulae, and the brackets [Lemmon] |
9519 | A 'substitution-instance' is a wff formed by consistent replacing variables with wffs [Lemmon] |
9529 | A wff is 'inconsistent' if all assignments to variables result in the value F [Lemmon] |
9531 | 'Contrary' propositions are never both true, so that ¬(A∧B) is a tautology [Lemmon] |
9534 | Two propositions are 'equivalent' if they mirror one another's truth-value [Lemmon] |
9530 | A wff is 'contingent' if produces at least one T and at least one F [Lemmon] |
9532 | 'Subcontrary' propositions are never both false, so that A∨B is a tautology [Lemmon] |
9533 | A 'implies' B if B is true whenever A is true (so that A→B is tautologous) [Lemmon] |
9528 | A wff is a 'tautology' if all assignments to variables result in the value T [Lemmon] |
9518 | A 'theorem' is the conclusion of a provable sequent with zero assumptions [Lemmon] |
9396 | DN: Given A, we may derive ¬¬A [Lemmon] |
9393 | A: we may assume any proposition at any stage [Lemmon] |
9399 | ∧E: Given A∧B, we may derive either A or B separately [Lemmon] |
9402 | RAA: If assuming A will prove B∧¬B, then derive ¬A [Lemmon] |
9395 | MTT: Given ¬B and A→B, we derive ¬A [Lemmon] |
9400 | ∨I: Given either A or B separately, we may derive A∨B [Lemmon] |
9401 | ∨E: Derive C from A∨B, if C can be derived both from A and from B [Lemmon] |
9398 | ∧I: Given A and B, we may derive A∧B [Lemmon] |
9397 | CP: Given a proof of B from A as assumption, we may derive A→B [Lemmon] |
9394 | MPP: Given A and A→B, we may derive B [Lemmon] |
9521 | 'Modus tollendo ponens' (MTP) says ¬P, P ∨ Q |- Q [Lemmon] |
9522 | 'Modus ponendo tollens' (MPT) says P, ¬(P ∧ Q) |- ¬Q [Lemmon] |
9525 | We can change conditionals into negated conjunctions with P→Q -||- ¬(P ∧ ¬Q) [Lemmon] |
9524 | We can change conditionals into disjunctions with P→Q -||- ¬P ∨ Q [Lemmon] |
9523 | De Morgan's Laws make negated conjunctions/disjunctions into non-negated disjunctions/conjunctions [Lemmon] |
9527 | The Distributive Laws can rearrange a pair of conjunctions or disjunctions [Lemmon] |
9526 | We can change conjunctions into negated conditionals with P→Q -||- ¬(P → ¬Q) [Lemmon] |
9537 | Truth-tables are good for showing invalidity [Lemmon] |
9538 | A truth-table test is entirely mechanical, but this won't work for more complex logic [Lemmon] |
9536 | If any of the nine rules of propositional logic are applied to tautologies, the result is a tautology [Lemmon] |
9539 | Propositional logic is complete, since all of its tautologous sequents are derivable [Lemmon] |
13909 | Write '(∀x)(...)' to mean 'take any x: then...', and '(∃x)(...)' to mean 'there is an x such that....' [Lemmon] |
13902 | 'Gm' says m has property G, and 'Pmn' says m has relation P to n [Lemmon] |
13911 | The 'symbols' are bracket, connective, term, variable, predicate letter, reverse-E [Lemmon] |
13910 | Our notation uses 'predicate-letters' (for 'properties'), 'variables', 'proper names', 'connectives' and 'quantifiers' [Lemmon] |
13904 | Universal Elimination (UE) lets us infer that an object has F, from all things having F [Lemmon] |
13906 | With finite named objects, we can generalise with &-Intro, but otherwise we need ∀-Intro [Lemmon] |
13908 | UE all-to-one; UI one-to-all; EI arbitrary-to-one; EE proof-to-one [Lemmon] |
13901 | Predicate logic uses propositional connectives and variables, plus new introduction and elimination rules [Lemmon] |
13903 | Universal elimination if you start with the universal, introduction if you want to end with it [Lemmon] |
13905 | If there is a finite domain and all objects have names, complex conjunctions can replace universal quantifiers [Lemmon] |
13900 | 'Some Frenchmen are generous' is rendered by (∃x)(Fx→Gx), and not with the conditional → [Lemmon] |
9520 | The paradoxes of material implication are P |- Q → P, and ¬P |- P → Q [Lemmon] |
8173 | Language can violate bivalence because of non-referring terms or ill-defined predicates [Dummett] |
8179 | The law of excluded middle is the logical reflection of the principle of bivalence [Dummett] |
16598 | Priority was a major topic of dispute for scholastics [Pasnau] |
16727 | In mixtures, the four elements ceased to exist, replaced by a mixed body with a form [Pasnau] |
8184 | Philosophers should not presume reality, but only invoke it when language requires it [Dummett] |
8185 | We can't make sense of a world not apprehended by a mind [Dummett] |
8163 | Since 'no bird here' and 'no squirrel here' seem the same, we must talk of 'atomic' facts [Dummett] |
8161 | We know we can state facts, with true statements [Dummett] |
8180 | 'That is red or orange' might be considered true, even though 'that is red' and 'that is orange' were not [Dummett] |
16732 | 17th C qualities are either microphysical, or phenomenal, or powers [Pasnau] |
16733 | 17th century authors only recognised categorical properties, never dispositions [Pasnau] |
16662 | The biggest question for scholastics is whether properties are real, or modes of substances [Pasnau] |
16767 | There is no centralised power, but we still need essence for a metaphysical understanding [Pasnau] |
16788 | Instead of adding Aristotelian forms to physical stuff, one could add dispositions [Pasnau] |
16738 | Scholastics reject dispositions, because they are not actual, as forms require [Pasnau] |
16649 | Scholastics say there is a genuine thing if it is 'separable' [Pasnau] |
16785 | If you reject essences, questions of individuation become extremely difficult [Pasnau] |
16680 | Scholastics thought Quantity could be the principle of individuation [Pasnau] |
16628 | Corpuscularianism promised a decent account of substance [Pasnau] |
16617 | Corpuscularian critics of scholasticism say only substances exist [Pasnau] |
16741 | Scholastics wanted to treat Aristotelianism as physics, rather than as metaphysics [Pasnau] |
16777 | If crowds are things at all, they seem to be Substances, since they bear properties [Pasnau] |
16615 | Scholastics use 'substantia' for thick concrete entities, and for thin metaphysical ones [Pasnau] |
16775 | For corpuscularians, a substance is just its integral parts [Pasnau] |
16769 | If clay survives destruction of the statue, the statue wasn't a substance, but a mere accident [Pasnau] |
16602 | Corpuscularianism rejected not only form, but also the dependence of matter on form [Pasnau] |
16612 | Hylomorphism may not be a rival to science, but an abstract account of unity and endurance [Pasnau] |
16613 | Hylomorphism declined because scholastics made it into a testable physical theory [Pasnau] |
16747 | Scholastics made forms substantial, in a way unintended by Aristotle [Pasnau] |
16759 | Scholastics began to see substantial form more as Aristotle's 'efficient' cause [Pasnau] |
16748 | Aquinas says a substance has one form; Scotists say it has many forms [Pasnau] |
16671 | Scholastic Quantity either gives a body parts, or spreads them out in a unified way [Pasnau] |
16579 | There may be different types of substrate, or temporary substrates [Pasnau] |
16596 | A substratum can't be 'bare', because it has a job to do [Pasnau] |
16584 | If a substrate gives causal support for change, quite a lot of the ingredients must endure [Pasnau] |
16580 | A substrate may be 'prime matter', which endures through every change [Pasnau] |
16749 | Aristotelians deny that all necessary properties are essential [Pasnau] |
16694 | Typical successive things are time and motion [Pasnau] |
16583 | Weak ex nihilo says it all comes from something; strong version says the old must partly endure [Pasnau] |
8178 | Empirical and a priori knowledge are not distinct, but are extremes of a sliding scale [Dummett] |
16783 | Essences must explain, so we can infer them causally from the accidents [Pasnau] |
8175 | A theory of thought will include propositional attitudes as well as propositions [Dummett] |
8174 | The theories of meaning and understanding are the only routes to an account of thought [Dummett] |
8165 | To 'abstract from' is a logical process, as opposed to the old mental view [Dummett] |
8168 | To know the truth-conditions of a sentence, you must already know the meaning [Dummett] |
8181 | A justificationist theory of meaning leads to the rejection of classical logic [Dummett] |
8182 | Verificationism could be realist, if we imagined the verification by a superhuman power [Dummett] |
8183 | If truths about the past depend on memories and current evidence, the past will change [Dummett] |
8176 | We could only guess the meanings of 'true' and 'false' when sentences were used [Dummett] |
8170 | Sentences are the primary semantic units, because they can say something [Dummett] |
8169 | We can't distinguish a proposition from its content [Dummett] |
16609 | Atomists say causation is mechanical collisions, and all true qualities are microscopic [Pasnau] |
16603 | In the 17th C matter became body, and was then studied by science [Pasnau] |
16592 | Atomism is the commonest version of corpuscularianism, but isn't required by it [Pasnau] |
16750 | If there are just arrangements of corpuscles, where are the boundaries between substances? [Pasnau] |
16722 | Scholastic causation is by changes in the primary qualities of hot, cold, wet, dry [Pasnau] |
16760 | Substantial forms were a step towards scientific essentialism [Pasnau] |
8186 | Time is the measure of change, so we can't speak of time before all change [Dummett] |
8167 | If Presentism is correct, we cannot even say that the present changes [Dummett] |
16581 | Scholastic authors agree that matter was created by God, out of nothing [Pasnau] |
16642 | Transubstantion says accidents of bread and wine don't inhere in the substance [Pasnau] |