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All the ideas for 'Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671', 'Essay on a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances' and 'The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism'

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79 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 1. History of Philosophy
Philosophy consists of choosing between Plato, Aristotle and Democritus [Pasnau]
Original philosophers invariably seek inspiration from past thinkers [Pasnau]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 3. Earlier European Philosophy / b. Early medieval philosophy
The commentaries of Averroes were the leading guide to Aristotle [Pasnau]
Modernity begins in the late 12th century, with Averroes's commentaries on Aristotle [Pasnau]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 3. Earlier European Philosophy / c. Later medieval philosophy
Once accidents were seen as real, 'Categories' became the major text for ontology [Pasnau]
In 1347, the Church effectively stopped philosophy for the next 300 years [Pasnau]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 3. Earlier European Philosophy / d. Renaissance philosophy
After c.1450 all of Plato was available. Before that, only the first half of 'Timaeus' was known [Pasnau]
Renaissance Platonism is peripheral [Pasnau]
Plato only made an impact locally in 15th century Italy [Pasnau]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / b. Seventeenth century philosophy
Philosophy could easily have died in 17th century, if it weren't for Descartes [Pasnau]
The 17th century is a metaphysical train wreck [Pasnau]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics aims at the simplest explanation, without regard to testability [Ellis]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Anti-Razor: if you can't account for a truth, keep positing things until you can [Pasnau]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
We can base logic on acceptability, and abandon the Fregean account by truth-preservation [Ellis]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
Mathematics is the formal study of the categorical dimensions of things [Ellis]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
Objects and substances are a subcategory of the natural kinds of processes [Ellis]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
A physical event is any change of distribution of energy [Ellis]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
Priority was a major topic of dispute for scholastics [Pasnau]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / b. Mixtures
In mixtures, the four elements ceased to exist, replaced by a mixed body with a form [Pasnau]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
17th C qualities are either microphysical, or phenomenal, or powers [Pasnau]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
Physical properties are those relevant to how a physical system might act [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
I support categorical properties, although most people only want causal powers [Ellis]
Essentialism needs categorical properties (spatiotemporal and numerical relations) and dispositions [Ellis]
Spatial, temporal and numerical relations have causal roles, without being causal [Ellis]
17th century authors only recognised categorical properties, never dispositions [Pasnau]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
The biggest question for scholastics is whether properties are real, or modes of substances [Pasnau]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
Properties and relations are discovered, so they can't be mere sets of individuals [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Causal powers can't rest on things which lack causal power [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
There is no centralised power, but we still need essence for a metaphysical understanding [Pasnau]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
Categoricals exist to influence powers. Such as structures, orientations and magnitudes [Ellis, by Williams,NE]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
Instead of adding Aristotelian forms to physical stuff, one could add dispositions [Pasnau]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
Causal powers are a proper subset of the dispositional properties [Ellis]
Scholastics reject dispositions, because they are not actual, as forms require [Pasnau]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
Scholastics say there is a genuine thing if it is 'separable' [Pasnau]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
If you reject essences, questions of individuation become extremely difficult [Pasnau]
Scholastics thought Quantity could be the principle of individuation [Pasnau]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Corpuscularianism promised a decent account of substance [Pasnau]
Corpuscularian critics of scholasticism say only substances exist [Pasnau]
Scholastics wanted to treat Aristotelianism as physics, rather than as metaphysics [Pasnau]
If crowds are things at all, they seem to be Substances, since they bear properties [Pasnau]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
Scholastics use 'substantia' for thick concrete entities, and for thin metaphysical ones [Pasnau]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
For corpuscularians, a substance is just its integral parts [Pasnau]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
If clay survives destruction of the statue, the statue wasn't a substance, but a mere accident [Pasnau]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
Categorical properties depend only on the structures they represent [Ellis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
Corpuscularianism rejected not only form, but also the dependence of matter on form [Pasnau]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / b. Form as principle
Hylomorphism may not be a rival to science, but an abstract account of unity and endurance [Pasnau]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / c. Form as causal
Hylomorphism declined because scholastics made it into a testable physical theory [Pasnau]
Scholastics made forms substantial, in a way unintended by Aristotle [Pasnau]
Scholastics began to see substantial form more as Aristotle's 'efficient' cause [Pasnau]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
Aquinas says a substance has one form; Scotists say it has many forms [Pasnau]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 4. Quantity of an Object
Scholastic Quantity either gives a body parts, or spreads them out in a unified way [Pasnau]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
There may be different types of substrate, or temporary substrates [Pasnau]
A substratum can't be 'bare', because it has a job to do [Pasnau]
If a substrate gives causal support for change, quite a lot of the ingredients must endure [Pasnau]
A substrate may be 'prime matter', which endures through every change [Pasnau]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
A real essence is a kind's distinctive properties [Ellis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
Aristotelians deny that all necessary properties are essential [Pasnau]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 6. Successive Things
Typical successive things are time and motion [Pasnau]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 10. Beginning of an Object
Weak ex nihilo says it all comes from something; strong version says the old must partly endure [Pasnau]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Metaphysical necessity holds between things in the world and things they make true [Ellis]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
Metaphysical necessities are those depending on the essential nature of things [Ellis]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
Science aims to explain things, not just describe them [Ellis]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
The probability of two events is the first probability times the second probability assuming the first [Bayes]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
Essences must explain, so we can infer them causally from the accidents [Pasnau]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
Atomists say causation is mechanical collisions, and all true qualities are microscopic [Pasnau]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / a. Early Modern matter
In the 17th C matter became body, and was then studied by science [Pasnau]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / b. Corpuscles
Atomism is the commonest version of corpuscularianism, but isn't required by it [Pasnau]
If there are just arrangements of corpuscles, where are the boundaries between substances? [Pasnau]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
There are natural kinds of processes [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
Natural kind structures go right down to the bottom level [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Scholastic causation is by changes in the primary qualities of hot, cold, wet, dry [Pasnau]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
Laws of nature are just descriptions of how things are disposed to behave [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Substantial forms were a step towards scientific essentialism [Pasnau]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
I deny forces as entities that intervene in causation, but are not themselves causal [Ellis]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / a. Energy
Energy is the key multi-valued property, vital to scientific realism [Ellis]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / a. Absolute time
Simultaneity can be temporal equidistance from the Big Bang [Ellis]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / e. Present moment
The present is the collapse of the light wavefront from the Big Bang [Ellis]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 3. The Beginning
Scholastic authors agree that matter was created by God, out of nothing [Pasnau]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / b. Transubstantiation
Transubstantion says accidents of bread and wine don't inhere in the substance [Pasnau]