16 ideas
| 9327 | Organisms understand their worlds better if they understand themselves [Gulick] |
| 10779 | A comprehension axiom is 'predicative' if the formula has no bound second-order variables [Linnebo] |
| 10781 | A 'pure logic' must be ontologically innocent, universal, and without presuppositions [Linnebo] |
| 10783 | Plural quantification depends too heavily on combinatorial and set-theoretic considerations [Linnebo] |
| 10778 | Can second-order logic be ontologically first-order, with all the benefits of second-order? [Linnebo] |
| 10782 | The modern concept of an object is rooted in quantificational logic [Linnebo] |
| 4304 | Descartes says there are two substance, Spinoza one, and Leibniz infinitely many [Cottingham] |
| 9325 | In contrast with knowledge, the notion of understanding emphasizes practical engagement [Gulick] |
| 9326 | Knowing-that is a much richer kind of knowing-how [Gulick] |
| 4303 | The notion of substance lies at the heart of rationalist metaphysics [Cottingham] |
| 9319 | Is consciousness a type of self-awareness, or is being self-aware a way of being conscious? [Gulick] |
| 9320 | Higher-order theories divide over whether the higher level involves thought or perception [Gulick] |
| 9321 | Higher-order models reduce the problem of consciousness to intentionality [Gulick] |
| 9322 | Maybe qualia only exist at the lower level, and a higher-level is needed for what-it-is-like [Gulick] |
| 4306 | For rationalists, it is necessary that effects be deducible from their causes [Cottingham] |
| 9324 | From the teleopragmatic perspective, life is largely an informational process [Gulick] |