84 ideas
3067 | A philosopher should have principles ready for understanding, like a surgeon with instruments [Aurelius] |
3426 | If one theory is reduced to another, we make fewer independent assumptions about the world [Kim] |
3072 | Everything is changing, including yourself and the whole universe [Aurelius] |
3431 | Supervenience suggest dependence without reduction (e.g. beauty) [Kim] |
17486 | Supervenience is simply modally robust property co-variance [Hendry] |
3437 | 'Physical facts determine all the facts' is the physicalists' slogan [Kim] |
3430 | Resemblance or similarity is the core of our concept of a property [Kim] |
3432 | Is weight a 'resultant' property of water, but transparency an 'emergent' property? [Kim] |
3434 | Emergent properties are 'brute facts' (inexplicable), but still cause things [Kim] |
3436 | Should properties be individuated by their causal powers? [Kim] |
3406 | Counterfactuals are either based on laws, or on nearby possible worlds [Kim, by PG] |
17481 | Nuclear charge (plus laws) explains electron structure and spectrum, but not vice versa [Hendry] |
3368 | Mind is basically qualities and intentionality, but how do they connect? [Kim] |
3392 | Mind is only interesting if it has causal powers [Kim] |
3396 | Experiment requires mental causation [Kim] |
3397 | Beliefs cause other beliefs [Kim] |
3367 | Both thought and language have intentionality [Kim] |
3365 | Intentionality involves both reference and content [Kim] |
3360 | Are pains pure qualia, or do they motivate? [Kim] |
3366 | Pain has no reference or content [Kim] |
3389 | Inverted qualia and zombies suggest experience isn't just functional [Kim] |
3391 | Crosswiring would show that pain and its function are separate [Kim, by PG] |
3422 | Externalism about content makes introspection depend on external evidence [Kim] |
3363 | We often can't decide what emotion, or even sensation, we are experiencing [Kim] |
3412 | How do we distinguish our anger from embarrassment? [Kim] |
3409 | Mental substance causation makes physics incomplete [Kim] |
3399 | If epiphenomenalism were true, we couldn't report consciousness [Kim] |
3390 | Are inverted or absent qualia coherent ideas? [Kim] |
3414 | What could demonstrate that zombies and inversion are impossible? [Kim] |
3359 | Cartesian dualism fails because it can't explain mental causation [Kim] |
3369 | Logical behaviourism translates mental language to behavioural [Kim] |
3428 | Behaviourism reduces mind to behaviour via bridging principles [Kim] |
3380 | Are dispositions real, or just a type of explanation? [Kim] |
3370 | What behaviour goes with mathematical beliefs? [Kim] |
3371 | Behaviour depends on lots of mental states together [Kim] |
3372 | Behaviour is determined by society as well as mental states [Kim] |
3373 | Snakes have different pain behaviour from us [Kim] |
3388 | Machine functionalism requires a Turing machine, causal-theoretical version doesn't [Kim] |
3379 | Neurons seem to be very similar and interchangeable [Kim] |
3384 | The person couldn't run Searle's Chinese Room without understanding Chinese [Kim] |
3393 | How do functional states give rise to mental causation? [Kim] |
3439 | Reductionism gets stuck with qualia [Kim] |
3427 | Reductionism is impossible if there aren't any 'bridge laws' between mental and physical [Kim] |
3376 | We can't assess evidence about mind without acknowledging phenomenal properties [Kim] |
3424 | Most modern physicalists are non-reductive property dualists [Kim] |
3362 | Supervenience says all souls are identical, being physically indiscernible [Kim] |
3413 | Zombies and inversion suggest non-reducible supervenience [Kim] |
3374 | Token physicalism isn't reductive; it just says all mental events have some physical properties [Kim] |
3433 | The core of the puzzle is the bridge laws between mind and brain [Kim] |
3377 | Elimination can either be by translation or by causal explanation [Kim] |
3438 | Reductionists deny new causal powers at the higher level [Kim] |
3440 | Without reductionism, mental causation is baffling [Kim] |
3375 | If an orange image is a brain state, are some parts of the brain orange? [Kim] |
3411 | How do we distinguish our attitudes from one another? [Kim] |
3387 | A culture without our folk psychology would be quite baffling [Kim] |
3386 | Folk psychology has been remarkably durable [Kim] |
3410 | Folk psychology has adapted to Freudianism [Kim] |
3394 | Maybe folk psychology is a simulation, not a theory [Kim] |
3382 | A machine with a mind might still fail the Turing Test [Kim] |
3383 | The Turing Test is too specifically human in its requirements [Kim] |
3408 | Two identical brain states could have different contents in different worlds [Kim] |
3420 | Two types of water are irrelevant to accounts of behaviour [Kim] |
3418 | 'Arthritis in my thigh' requires a social context for its content to be meaningful [Kim] |
3416 | Content may match several things in the environment [Kim] |
3421 | Content is best thought of as truth conditions [Kim] |
3417 | Content depends on other content as well as the facts [Kim] |
3419 | Pain, our own existence, and negative existentials, are not external [Kim] |
3403 | We assume people believe the obvious logical consequences of their known beliefs [Kim] |
3402 | If someone says "I do and don't like x", we don't assume a contradiction [Kim] |
3066 | Nothing is evil which is according to nature [Aurelius] |
3071 | Justice has no virtue opposed to it, but pleasure has temperance opposed to it [Aurelius] |
3069 | The art of life is more like the wrestler's than the dancer's [Aurelius] |
3065 | Humans are naturally made for co-operation [Aurelius] |
17478 | Maybe two kinds are the same if there is no change of entropy on isothermal mixing [Hendry] |
3401 | A common view is that causal connections must be instances of a law [Kim] |
3407 | Laws are either 'strict', or they involve a 'ceteris paribus' clause [Kim] |
17479 | The nature of an element must survive chemical change, so it is the nucleus, not the electrons [Hendry] |
17484 | Maybe the nature of water is macroscopic, and not in the microstructure [Hendry] |
17485 | Maybe water is the smallest part of it that still counts as water (which is H2O molecules) [Hendry] |
17483 | Water continuously changes, with new groupings of molecules [Hendry] |
17482 | Compounds can differ with the same collection of atoms, so structure matters too [Hendry] |
17476 | Elements survive chemical change, and are tracked to explain direction and properties [Hendry] |
17477 | Defining elements by atomic number allowed atoms of an element to have different masses [Hendry] |
17480 | Generally it is nuclear charge (not nuclear mass) which determines behaviour [Hendry] |