Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Intro to 'Questions of Time and Tense'', 'Mereology' and 'Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics'

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24 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 10. Making Future Truths
15186 In the tenseless view, all times are equally real, so statements of the future have truth-values [Le Poidevin]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
14713 Truth in a scenario is the negation in that scenario being a priori incoherent [Chalmers]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
10653 Maybe set theory need not be well-founded [Varzi]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
10648 Mereology need not be nominalist, though it is often taken to be so [Varzi]
10655 Are there mereological atoms, and are all objects made of them? [Varzi]
10659 There is something of which everything is part, but no null-thing which is part of everything [Varzi]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
10661 'Composition is identity' says multitudes are the reality, loosely composing single things [Varzi]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
10647 Parts may or may not be attached, demarcated, arbitrary, material, extended, spatial or temporal [Varzi]
10651 If 'part' is reflexive, then identity is a limit case of parthood [Varzi]
10649 'Part' stands for a reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive relation [Varzi]
10654 The parthood relation will help to define at least seven basic predicates [Varzi]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
10658 Sameness of parts won't guarantee identity if their arrangement matters [Varzi]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
10652 Conceivability may indicate possibility, but literary fantasy does not [Varzi]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
14712 A sentence is a priori if no possible way the world might actually be could make it false [Chalmers]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
15190 Evil can't be an illusion, because then the illusion that there is evil would be evil [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block
15195 If the future is not real, we don't seem to have any obligation to future individuals [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
15188 If things don't persist through time, then change makes no sense [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / c. Tenses and time
15191 At the very least, minds themselves seem to be tensed [Le Poidevin]
15197 Fiction seems to lack a tensed perspective, and offers an example of tenseless language [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / d. Time series
15189 Things which have ceased change their A-series position; things that persist change their B-series position [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series
15187 It is claimed that the tense view entails the unreality of both future and past [Le Poidevin]
15192 We share a common now, but not a common here [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / f. Tenseless (B) series
15193 The new tenseless theory offers indexical truth-conditions, instead of a reductive analysis [Le Poidevin]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 5. God and Time
15196 God being inside or outside of time both raise a group of difficult problems [Le Poidevin]