Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Intro to 'Questions of Time and Tense'', 'Transworld Identity or worldbound Individuals?' and 'Confessions of a Philosopher'

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19 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 10. Making Future Truths
15186 In the tenseless view, all times are equally real, so statements of the future have truth-values [Le Poidevin]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
11984 Asserting a possible property is to say it would have had the property if that world had been actual [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
11980 A possible world is a maximal possible state of affairs [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
11982 If possible Socrates differs from actual Socrates, the Indiscernibility of Identicals says they are different [Plantinga]
11983 It doesn't matter that we can't identify the possible Socrates; we can't identify adults from baby photos [Plantinga]
11985 If individuals can only exist in one world, then they can never lack any of their properties [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
11986 The counterparts of Socrates have self-identity, but only the actual Socrates has identity-with-Socrates [Plantinga]
11987 Counterpart Theory absurdly says I would be someone else if things went differently [Plantinga]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
3102 Why don't we experience or remember going to sleep at night? [Magee]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
15190 Evil can't be an illusion, because then the illusion that there is evil would be evil [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block
15195 If the future is not real, we don't seem to have any obligation to future individuals [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
15188 If things don't persist through time, then change makes no sense [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / c. Tenses and time
15191 At the very least, minds themselves seem to be tensed [Le Poidevin]
15197 Fiction seems to lack a tensed perspective, and offers an example of tenseless language [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / d. Time series
15189 Things which have ceased change their A-series position; things that persist change their B-series position [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series
15187 It is claimed that the tense view entails the unreality of both future and past [Le Poidevin]
15192 We share a common now, but not a common here [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / f. Tenseless (B) series
15193 The new tenseless theory offers indexical truth-conditions, instead of a reductive analysis [Le Poidevin]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 5. God and Time
15196 God being inside or outside of time both raise a group of difficult problems [Le Poidevin]