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All the ideas for 'Intro to 'Questions of Time and Tense'', 'Russell's Metaphysical Logic' and 'Treatise on Quantity'

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23 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 8. Impredicative Definition
21704 'Impredictative' definitions fix a class in terms of the greater class to which it belongs [Linsky,B]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 10. Making Future Truths
15186 In the tenseless view, all times are equally real, so statements of the future have truth-values [Le Poidevin]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / p. Axiom of Reducibility
21705 Reducibility says any impredicative function has an appropriate predicative replacement [Linsky,B]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
21727 Definite descriptions theory eliminates the King of France, but not the Queen of England [Linsky,B]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 5. Extensionalism
21719 Extensionalism means what is true of a function is true of coextensive functions [Linsky,B]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
21723 The task of logicism was to define by logic the concepts 'number', 'successor' and '0' [Linsky,B]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
21721 Higher types are needed to distinguished intensional phenomena which are coextensive [Linsky,B]
21703 Types are 'ramified' when there are further differences between the type of quantifier and its range [Linsky,B]
21714 The ramified theory subdivides each type, according to the range of the variables [Linsky,B]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
21713 Did logicism fail, when Russell added three nonlogical axioms, to save mathematics? [Linsky,B]
21715 For those who abandon logicism, standard set theory is a rival option [Linsky,B]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
21729 Construct properties as sets of objects, or say an object must be in the set to have the property [Linsky,B]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 4. Quantity of an Object
16672 Quantity is the quantified parts of a thing, plus location and coordination [Olivi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
15190 Evil can't be an illusion, because then the illusion that there is evil would be evil [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block
15195 If the future is not real, we don't seem to have any obligation to future individuals [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
15188 If things don't persist through time, then change makes no sense [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / c. Tenses and time
15191 At the very least, minds themselves seem to be tensed [Le Poidevin]
15197 Fiction seems to lack a tensed perspective, and offers an example of tenseless language [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / d. Time series
15189 Things which have ceased change their A-series position; things that persist change their B-series position [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series
15187 It is claimed that the tense view entails the unreality of both future and past [Le Poidevin]
15192 We share a common now, but not a common here [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / f. Tenseless (B) series
15193 The new tenseless theory offers indexical truth-conditions, instead of a reductive analysis [Le Poidevin]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 5. God and Time
15196 God being inside or outside of time both raise a group of difficult problems [Le Poidevin]