Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Intro to 'Questions of Time and Tense'', 'Can there be Vague Objects?' and 'What Mary Didn't Know'

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20 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 10. Making Future Truths
In the tenseless view, all times are equally real, so statements of the future have truth-values [Le Poidevin]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
Evans argues (falsely!) that a contradiction follows from treating objects as vague [Evans, by Lowe]
Is it coherent that reality is vague, identities can be vague, and objects can have fuzzy boundaries? [Evans]
There clearly are vague identity statements, and Evans's argument has a false conclusion [Evans, by Lewis]
Evans assumes there can be vague identity statements, and that his proof cannot be right [Evans, by Lewis]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
If a=b is indeterminate, then a=/=b, and so there cannot be indeterminate identity [Evans, by Thomasson]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
There can't be vague identity; a and b must differ, since a, unlike b, is only vaguely the same as b [Evans, by PG]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
I say Mary does not have new knowledge, but knows an old fact in a new way [Perry on Jackson]
Is it unfair that physicalist knowledge can be written down, but dualist knowledge can't be [Perry on Jackson]
Mary knows all the physical facts of seeing red, but experiencing it is new knowledge [Jackson]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
Evil can't be an illusion, because then the illusion that there is evil would be evil [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block
If the future is not real, we don't seem to have any obligation to future individuals [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
If things don't persist through time, then change makes no sense [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / c. Tenses and time
At the very least, minds themselves seem to be tensed [Le Poidevin]
Fiction seems to lack a tensed perspective, and offers an example of tenseless language [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / d. Time series
Things which have ceased change their A-series position; things that persist change their B-series position [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series
It is claimed that the tense view entails the unreality of both future and past [Le Poidevin]
We share a common now, but not a common here [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / f. Tenseless (B) series
The new tenseless theory offers indexical truth-conditions, instead of a reductive analysis [Le Poidevin]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 5. God and Time
God being inside or outside of time both raise a group of difficult problems [Le Poidevin]