Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Intro to 'Questions of Time and Tense'', 'Matters of Mind' and 'Essays on Intellectual Powers 1: Preliminary'

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21 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 10. Making Future Truths
In the tenseless view, all times are equally real, so statements of the future have truth-values [Le Poidevin]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 1. Common Sense
Many truths seem obvious, and point to universal agreement - which is what we find [Reid]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind
Mindless bodies are zombies, bodiless minds are ghosts [Sturgeon]
Types are properties, and tokens are events. Are they split between mental and physical, or not? [Sturgeon]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
Intentionality isn't reducible, because of its experiential aspect [Sturgeon]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
Rule-following can't be reduced to the physical [Sturgeon]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
The main argument for physicalism is its simple account of causation [Sturgeon]
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
Only philosophers treat ideas as objects [Reid]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
Do facts cause thoughts, or embody them, or what? [Sturgeon]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 9. Ambiguity
The ambiguity of words impedes the advancement of knowledge [Reid]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
Evil can't be an illusion, because then the illusion that there is evil would be evil [Le Poidevin]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Similar effects come from similar causes, and causes are only what are sufficient for the effects [Reid]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block
If the future is not real, we don't seem to have any obligation to future individuals [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
If things don't persist through time, then change makes no sense [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / c. Tenses and time
At the very least, minds themselves seem to be tensed [Le Poidevin]
Fiction seems to lack a tensed perspective, and offers an example of tenseless language [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / d. Time series
Things which have ceased change their A-series position; things that persist change their B-series position [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series
It is claimed that the tense view entails the unreality of both future and past [Le Poidevin]
We share a common now, but not a common here [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / f. Tenseless (B) series
The new tenseless theory offers indexical truth-conditions, instead of a reductive analysis [Le Poidevin]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 5. God and Time
God being inside or outside of time both raise a group of difficult problems [Le Poidevin]