21 ideas
15186 | In the tenseless view, all times are equally real, so statements of the future have truth-values [Le Poidevin] |
23633 | Many truths seem obvious, and point to universal agreement - which is what we find [Reid] |
2534 | Mindless bodies are zombies, bodiless minds are ghosts [Sturgeon] |
2537 | Types are properties, and tokens are events. Are they split between mental and physical, or not? [Sturgeon] |
2532 | Intentionality isn't reducible, because of its experiential aspect [Sturgeon] |
2533 | Rule-following can't be reduced to the physical [Sturgeon] |
2535 | The main argument for physicalism is its simple account of causation [Sturgeon] |
23630 | Only philosophers treat ideas as objects [Reid] |
2536 | Do facts cause thoughts, or embody them, or what? [Sturgeon] |
23629 | The ambiguity of words impedes the advancement of knowledge [Reid] |
15190 | Evil can't be an illusion, because then the illusion that there is evil would be evil [Le Poidevin] |
23632 | Similar effects come from similar causes, and causes are only what are sufficient for the effects [Reid] |
15195 | If the future is not real, we don't seem to have any obligation to future individuals [Le Poidevin] |
15188 | If things don't persist through time, then change makes no sense [Le Poidevin] |
15191 | At the very least, minds themselves seem to be tensed [Le Poidevin] |
15197 | Fiction seems to lack a tensed perspective, and offers an example of tenseless language [Le Poidevin] |
15189 | Things which have ceased change their A-series position; things that persist change their B-series position [Le Poidevin] |
15187 | It is claimed that the tense view entails the unreality of both future and past [Le Poidevin] |
15192 | We share a common now, but not a common here [Le Poidevin] |
15193 | The new tenseless theory offers indexical truth-conditions, instead of a reductive analysis [Le Poidevin] |
15196 | God being inside or outside of time both raise a group of difficult problems [Le Poidevin] |