13 ideas
17990 | Instances of minimal truth miss out propositions inexpressible in current English [Hofweber] |
10061 | The If-thenist view only seems to work for the axiomatised portions of mathematics [Musgrave] |
10065 | Perhaps If-thenism survives in mathematics if we stick to first-order logic [Musgrave] |
17988 | Quantification can't all be substitutional; some reference is obviously to objects [Hofweber] |
10049 | Logical truths may contain non-logical notions, as in 'all men are men' [Musgrave] |
10050 | A statement is logically true if it comes out true in all interpretations in all (non-empty) domains [Musgrave] |
10058 | No two numbers having the same successor relies on the Axiom of Infinity [Musgrave] |
10062 | Formalism seems to exclude all creative, growing mathematics [Musgrave] |
10063 | Formalism is a bulwark of logical positivism [Musgrave] |
13120 | Chisholm divides things into contingent and necessary, and then individuals, states and non-states [Chisholm, by Westerhoff] |
17989 | Since properties have properties, there can be a typed or a type-free theory of them [Hofweber] |
10060 | Logical positivists adopted an If-thenist version of logicism about numbers [Musgrave] |
17991 | Holism says language can't be translated; the expressibility hypothesis says everything can [Hofweber] |