55 ideas
15801 | Many philosophers aim to understand metaphysics by studying ourselves [Chisholm] |
11159 | My account shows how the concept works, rather than giving an analysis [Fine,K] |
15802 | I use variables to show that each item remains the same entity throughout [Chisholm] |
11157 | Modern philosophy has largely abandoned real definitions, apart from sortals [Fine,K] |
11171 | Defining a term and giving the essence of an object don't just resemble - they are the same [Fine,K] |
15832 | Events are states of affairs that occur at certain places and times [Chisholm] |
11151 | An object is dependent if its essence prevents it from existing without some other object [Fine,K] |
15829 | The mark of a state of affairs is that it is capable of being accepted [Chisholm] |
15809 | A state of affairs pertains to a thing if it implies that it has some property [Chisholm] |
15828 | I propose that events and propositions are two types of states of affairs [Chisholm] |
15830 | Some properties can never be had, like being a round square [Chisholm] |
15827 | Some properties, such as 'being a widow', can be seen as 'rooted outside the time they are had' [Chisholm] |
15804 | If some dogs are brown, that entails the properties of 'being brown' and 'being canine' [Chisholm] |
8499 | Nominalists cannot translate 'red resembles pink more than blue' into particulars [Jackson] |
8500 | Colour resemblance isn't just resemblance between things; 'colour' must be mentioned [Jackson] |
15810 | Maybe we can only individuate things by relating them to ourselves [Chisholm] |
15805 | Being the tallest man is an 'individual concept', but not a haecceity [Chisholm] |
15807 | A haecceity is a property had necessarily, and strictly confined to one entity [Chisholm] |
15814 | A peach is sweet and fuzzy, but it doesn't 'have' those qualities [Chisholm] |
12852 | If x is ever part of y, then y is necessarily such that x is part of y at any time that y exists [Chisholm, by Simons] |
11152 | Essences are either taken as real definitions, or as necessary properties [Fine,K] |
15808 | A traditional individual essence includes all of a thing's necessary characteristics [Chisholm] |
11161 | Essentially having a property is naturally expressed as 'the property it must have to be what it is' [Fine,K] |
11160 | Simple modal essentialism refers to necessary properties of an object [Fine,K] |
11158 | Essentialist claims can be formulated more clearly with quantified modal logic [Fine,K] |
11167 | Metaphysical necessity is a special case of essence, not vice versa [Fine,K] |
16537 | Essence as necessary properties produces a profusion of essential properties [Fine,K, by Lowe] |
11163 | The nature of singleton Socrates has him as a member, but not vice versa [Fine,K] |
11164 | It is not part of the essence of Socrates that a huge array of necessary truths should hold [Fine,K] |
10935 | An essential property of something must be bound up with what it is to be that thing [Fine,K, by Rami] |
10936 | Essential properties are part of an object's 'definition' [Fine,K, by Rami] |
12851 | Intermittence is seen in a toy fort, which is dismantled then rebuilt with the same bricks [Chisholm, by Simons] |
11165 | If Socrates lacks necessary existence, then his nature cannot require his parents' existence [Fine,K] |
15806 | The property of being identical with me is an individual concept [Chisholm] |
15826 | There is 'loose' identity between things if their properties, or truths about them, might differ [Chisholm] |
11166 | The subject of a proposition need not be the source of its necessity [Fine,K] |
11169 | Conceptual necessities rest on the nature of all concepts [Fine,K] |
11162 | Socrates is necessarily distinct from the Eiffel Tower, but that is not part of his essence [Fine,K] |
11168 | Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all objects [Fine,K] |
15819 | Do sense-data have structure, location, weight, and constituting matter? [Chisholm] |
15816 | 'I feel depressed' is more like 'he runs slowly' than like 'he has a red book' [Chisholm] |
15817 | If we can say a man senses 'redly', why not also 'rectangularly'? [Chisholm] |
15818 | So called 'sense-data' are best seen as 'modifications' of the person experiencing them [Chisholm] |
15831 | Explanations have states of affairs as their objects [Chisholm] |
15811 | I am picked out uniquely by my individual essence, which is 'being identical with myself' [Chisholm] |
15815 | Sartre says the ego is 'opaque'; I prefer to say that it is 'transparent' [Chisholm] |
15813 | People use 'I' to refer to themselves, with the meaning of their own individual essence [Chisholm] |
15803 | Bad theories of the self see it as abstract, or as a bundle, or as a process [Chisholm] |
15821 | Determinism claims that every event has a sufficient causal pre-condition [Chisholm] |
11170 | Analytic truth may only be true in virtue of the meanings of certain terms [Fine,K] |
11172 | The meaning of 'bachelor' is irrelevant to the meaning of 'unmarried man' [Fine,K] |
15824 | There are mere omissions (through ignorance, perhaps), and people can 'commit an omission' [Chisholm] |
15822 | The concept of physical necessity is basic to both causation, and to the concept of nature [Chisholm] |
15823 | Some propose a distinct 'agent causation', as well as 'event causation' [Chisholm] |
15820 | A 'law of nature' is just something which is physically necessary [Chisholm] |