15 ideas
| 17879 | Axiomatising set theory makes it all relative [Skolem] |
| 13733 | Frege considered definite descriptions to be genuine singular terms [Frege, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| 9874 | Contradiction arises from Frege's substitutional account of second-order quantification [Dummett on Frege] |
| 17878 | If a 1st-order proposition is satisfied, it is satisfied in a denumerably infinite domain [Skolem] |
| 18252 | Real numbers are ratios of quantities, such as lengths or masses [Frege] |
| 18271 | We can't prove everything, but we can spell out the unproved, so that foundations are clear [Frege] |
| 17880 | Integers and induction are clear as foundations, but set-theory axioms certainly aren't [Skolem] |
| 10623 | Frege defined number in terms of extensions of concepts, but needed Basic Law V to explain extensions [Frege, by Hale/Wright] |
| 9975 | Frege ignored Cantor's warning that a cardinal set is not just a concept-extension [Tait on Frege] |
| 17881 | Mathematician want performable operations, not propositions about objects [Skolem] |
| 18165 | My Basic Law V is a law of pure logic [Frege] |
| 11966 | If there are essential properties, how do you find out what they are? [Chisholm] |
| 11965 | Could possible Adam gradually transform into Noah, and vice versa? [Chisholm] |
| 9190 | A concept is a function mapping objects onto truth-values, if they fall under the concept [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 13665 | Frege took the study of concepts to be part of logic [Frege, by Shapiro] |