17 ideas
4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
10017 | Truth in a model is more tractable than the general notion of truth [Hodes] |
10018 | Truth is quite different in interpreted set theory and in the skeleton of its language [Hodes] |
10015 | Higher-order logic may be unintelligible, but it isn't set theory [Hodes] |
10011 | Identity is a level one relation with a second-order definition [Hodes] |
10016 | When an 'interpretation' creates a model based on truth, this doesn't include Fregean 'sense' [Hodes] |
10027 | Mathematics is higher-order modal logic [Hodes] |
10026 | Arithmetic must allow for the possibility of only a finite total of objects [Hodes] |
10021 | It is claimed that numbers are objects which essentially represent cardinality quantifiers [Hodes] |
10022 | Numerical terms can't really stand for quantifiers, because that would make them first-level [Hodes] |
9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
10023 | Talk of mirror images is 'encoded fictions' about real facts [Hodes] |
15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
20062 | If a desire leads to a satisfactory result by an odd route, the causal theory looks wrong [Chisholm] |
20054 | There has to be a brain event which is not caused by another event, but by the agent [Chisholm] |
4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |