Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Interview with Baggini and Stangroom', 'Relativism' and 'Notebooks 1914-1916'

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35 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 5. Modern Philosophy / d. Contemporary philosophy
4697 There has been a distinct 'Social Turn' in recent philosophy, like the earlier 'Linguistic Turn' [O'Grady]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
18274 Analysis complicates a statement, but only as far as the complexity of its meaning [Wittgenstein]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
4731 Good reasoning will avoid contradiction, enhance coherence, not ignore evidence, and maximise evidence [O'Grady]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 7. Thought Experiments
4735 Just as maps must simplify their subject matter, so thought has to be reductionist about reality [O'Grady]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
4703 The epistemic theory of truth presents it as 'that which is licensed by our best theory of reality' [O'Grady]
4701 To say a relative truth is inexpressible in other frameworks is 'weak', while saying it is false is 'strong' [O'Grady]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
16908 We can dispense with self-evidence, if language itself prevents logical mistakes [Jeshion on Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
4705 Logical relativism appears if we allow more than one legitimate logical system [O'Grady]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
4700 A third value for truth might be "indeterminate", or a point on a scale between 'true' and 'false' [O'Grady]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
18276 A statement's logical form derives entirely from its constituents [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
6563 'And' and 'not' are non-referring terms, which do not represent anything [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin]
4704 Wittgenstein reduced Russell's five primitive logical symbols to a mere one [O'Grady]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
23472 The sense of propositions relies on the world's basic logical structure [Wittgenstein]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
4711 Anti-realists say our theories (such as wave-particle duality) give reality incompatible properties [O'Grady]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
4698 What counts as a fact partly depends on the availability of human concepts to describe them [O'Grady]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
4715 We may say that objects have intrinsic identity conditions, but still allow multiple accounts of them [O'Grady]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
4719 Maybe developments in logic and geometry have shown that the a priori may be relative [O'Grady]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
23500 My main problem is the order of the world, and whether it is knowable a priori [Wittgenstein]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
4720 Sense-data are only safe from scepticism if they are primitive and unconceptualised [O'Grady]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
4722 Modern epistemology centres on debates about foundations, and about external justification [O'Grady]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
4724 Internalists say the reasons for belief must be available to the subject, and externalists deny this [O'Grady]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
4723 Coherence involves support from explanation and evidence, and also probability and confirmation [O'Grady]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
4709 Ontological relativists are anti-realists, who deny that our theories carve nature at the joints [O'Grady]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 2. Knowledge as Convention
4725 Contextualism says that knowledge is relative to its context; 'empty' depends on your interests [O'Grady]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
4732 One may understand a realm of ideas, but be unable to judge their rationality or truth [O'Grady]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
22323 The philosophical I is the metaphysical subject, the limit - not a part of the world [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
23481 Propositions assemble a world experimentally, like the model of a road accident [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
4710 Verificationism was attacked by the deniers of the analytic-synthetic distinction, needed for 'facts' [O'Grady]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
4717 If we abandon the analytic-synthetic distinction, scepticism about meaning may be inevitable [O'Grady]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / a. Translation
4706 Early Quine says all beliefs could be otherwise, but later he said we would assume mistranslation [O'Grady]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
4734 Cryptographers can recognise that something is a language, without translating it [O'Grady]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
6853 Consequentialism wrongly assumes a clear line between an act and its consequences [Crisp,R]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
4678 Absolute prohibitions are the essence of ethics, and suicide is the most obvious example [Wittgenstein]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 4. Ecology
6854 Does the environment have value in itself? [Crisp,R]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / e. Fideism
4727 The chief problem for fideists is other fideists who hold contrary ideas [O'Grady]