45 ideas
3879 | Philosophy aims to provide a theory of everything [Scruton] |
16123 | Whenever you perceive a community of things, you should also hunt out differences in the group [Plato] |
3891 | If p entails q, then p is sufficient for q, and q is necessary for p [Scruton] |
16125 | To reveal a nature, divide down, and strip away what it has in common with other things [Plato] |
16124 | No one wants to define 'weaving' just for the sake of weaving [Plato] |
3894 | We may define 'good' correctly, but then ask whether the application of the definition is good [Scruton] |
3883 | A true proposition is consistent with every other true proposition [Scruton] |
3884 | The pragmatist does not really have a theory of truth [Scruton] |
3907 | Could you be intellectually acquainted with numbers, but unable to count objects? [Scruton] |
3908 | If maths contains unprovable truths, then maths cannot be reduced to a set of proofs [Scruton] |
3906 | If possible worlds are needed to define properties, maybe we should abandon properties [Scruton] |
3888 | Hume assumes that necessity can only be de dicto, not de re [Scruton] |
3903 | The conceivable can't be a test of the possible, if there are things which are possible but inconceivable [Scruton] |
3897 | Epistemology is about the justification of belief, not the definition of knowledge [Scruton] |
3881 | In the Cogito argument consciousness develops into self-consciousness [Scruton] |
5961 | The soul gets its goodness from god, and its evil from previous existence. [Plato] |
3887 | Maybe our knowledge of truth and causation is synthetic a priori [Scruton] |
3901 | Touch only seems to reveal primary qualities [Scruton] |
3885 | We only conceive of primary qualities as attached to secondary qualities [Scruton] |
3910 | If primary and secondary qualities are distinct, what has the secondary qualities? [Scruton] |
3899 | The representational theory says perceptual states are intentional states [Scruton] |
3898 | My belief that it will rain tomorrow can't be caused by its raining tomorrow [Scruton] |
3880 | Logical positivism avoids scepticism, by closing the gap between evidence and conclusion [Scruton] |
3878 | Why should you believe someone who says there are no truths? [Scruton] |
3892 | Every event having a cause, and every event being determined by its cause, are not the same [Scruton] |
3911 | The very concept of a substance denies the possibility of mutual interaction and dependence [Scruton] |
283 | The question of whether or not to persuade comes before the science of persuasion [Plato] |
3882 | Wittgenstein makes it impossible to build foundations from something that is totally private [Scruton] |
282 | Non-physical beauty can only be shown clearly by speech [Plato] |
6968 | Some people think there are ethical facts, but of a 'queer' sort [Ayer] |
6972 | A right attitude is just an attitude one is prepared to stand by [Ayer] |
6973 | Moral theories are all meta-ethical, and are neutral as regards actual conduct [Ayer] |
6974 | Moral judgements cannot be the logical consequence of a moral philosophy [Ayer] |
6971 | I would describe intuitions of good as feelings of approval [Ayer] |
6969 | Approval of historical or fictional murders gives us leave to imitate them [Ayer] |
6970 | Moral judgements are not expressions, but are elements in a behaviour pattern [Ayer] |
3896 | Any social theory of morality has the problem of the 'free rider', who only pretends to join in [Scruton] |
281 | The arts produce good and beautiful things by preserving the mean [Plato] |
3886 | Membership is the greatest source of obligation [Scruton] |
3895 | The categorical imperative is not just individual, but can be used for negotiations between strangers [Scruton] |
22559 | Democracy is the worst of good constitutions, but the best of bad constitutions [Plato, by Aristotle] |
3890 | 'Cause' used to just mean any valid explanation [Scruton] |
3904 | Measuring space requires no movement while I do it [Scruton] |
279 | Only divine things can always stay the same, and bodies are not like that [Plato] |
3905 | 'Existence' is not a predicate of 'man', but of the concept of man, saying it has at least one instance [Scruton] |