44 ideas
| 3879 | Philosophy aims to provide a theory of everything [Scruton] |
| 3891 | If p entails q, then p is sufficient for q, and q is necessary for p [Scruton] |
| 3894 | We may define 'good' correctly, but then ask whether the application of the definition is good [Scruton] |
| 3883 | A true proposition is consistent with every other true proposition [Scruton] |
| 3884 | The pragmatist does not really have a theory of truth [Scruton] |
| 3907 | Could you be intellectually acquainted with numbers, but unable to count objects? [Scruton] |
| 3908 | If maths contains unprovable truths, then maths cannot be reduced to a set of proofs [Scruton] |
| 3906 | If possible worlds are needed to define properties, maybe we should abandon properties [Scruton] |
| 12132 | Indiscernibility is a necessary and sufficient condition for identity [Brody] |
| 15834 | Brody bases sortal essentialism on properties required throughout something's existence [Brody, by Mackie,P] |
| 12140 | Modern emphasis is on properties had essentially; traditional emphasis is on sort-defining properties [Brody] |
| 11895 | A sortal essence is a property which once possessed always possessed [Brody, by Mackie,P] |
| 12141 | Maybe essential properties are those which determine a natural kind? [Brody] |
| 12137 | De re essentialism standardly says all possible objects identical with a have a's essential properties [Brody] |
| 12142 | Essentially, a has P, always had P, must have had P, and has never had a future without P [Brody] |
| 12143 | An object having a property essentially is equivalent to its having it necessarily [Brody] |
| 12144 | Essentialism is justified if the essential properties of things explain their other properties [Brody] |
| 12139 | Mereological essentialism says that every part that ensures the existence is essential [Brody] |
| 12135 | Interrupted objects have two first moments of existence, which could be two beginnings [Brody] |
| 12130 | a and b share all properties; so they share being-identical-with-a; so a = b [Brody] |
| 3888 | Hume assumes that necessity can only be de dicto, not de re [Scruton] |
| 3903 | The conceivable can't be a test of the possible, if there are things which are possible but inconceivable [Scruton] |
| 12138 | Identity across possible worlds is prior to rigid designation [Brody] |
| 3897 | Epistemology is about the justification of belief, not the definition of knowledge [Scruton] |
| 3881 | In the Cogito argument consciousness develops into self-consciousness [Scruton] |
| 3887 | Maybe our knowledge of truth and causation is synthetic a priori [Scruton] |
| 3901 | Touch only seems to reveal primary qualities [Scruton] |
| 3885 | We only conceive of primary qualities as attached to secondary qualities [Scruton] |
| 3910 | If primary and secondary qualities are distinct, what has the secondary qualities? [Scruton] |
| 3899 | The representational theory says perceptual states are intentional states [Scruton] |
| 3898 | My belief that it will rain tomorrow can't be caused by its raining tomorrow [Scruton] |
| 3880 | Logical positivism avoids scepticism, by closing the gap between evidence and conclusion [Scruton] |
| 3878 | Why should you believe someone who says there are no truths? [Scruton] |
| 3892 | Every event having a cause, and every event being determined by its cause, are not the same [Scruton] |
| 3911 | The very concept of a substance denies the possibility of mutual interaction and dependence [Scruton] |
| 3882 | Wittgenstein makes it impossible to build foundations from something that is totally private [Scruton] |
| 3896 | Any social theory of morality has the problem of the 'free rider', who only pretends to join in [Scruton] |
| 3886 | Membership is the greatest source of obligation [Scruton] |
| 3895 | The categorical imperative is not just individual, but can be used for negotiations between strangers [Scruton] |
| 21094 | There are two kinds of right - to power, and to property [Hume] |
| 21095 | It is an exaggeration to say that property is the foundation of all government [Hume] |
| 3890 | 'Cause' used to just mean any valid explanation [Scruton] |
| 3904 | Measuring space requires no movement while I do it [Scruton] |
| 3905 | 'Existence' is not a predicate of 'man', but of the concept of man, saying it has at least one instance [Scruton] |