38 ideas
11147 | Naturalistic philosophers oppose analysis, preferring explanation to a priori intuition [Margolis/Laurence] |
3035 | Dialectic involves conversations with short questions and brief answers [Diog. Laertius] |
11141 | Modern empiricism tends to emphasise psychological connections, not semantic relations [Margolis/Laurence] |
1816 | Sceptics say demonstration depends on self-demonstrating things, or indemonstrable things [Diog. Laertius] |
1819 | Scepticism has two dogmas: that nothing is definable, and every argument has an opposite argument [Diog. Laertius] |
3064 | When sceptics say that nothing is definable, or all arguments have an opposite, they are being dogmatic [Diog. Laertius] |
3033 | Induction moves from some truths to similar ones, by contraries or consequents [Diog. Laertius] |
11142 | Body-type seems to affect a mind's cognition and conceptual scheme [Margolis/Laurence] |
11121 | Language of thought has subject/predicate form and includes logical devices [Margolis/Laurence] |
11120 | Concepts are either representations, or abilities, or Fregean senses [Margolis/Laurence] |
11122 | A computer may have propositional attitudes without representations [Margolis/Laurence] |
11124 | Do mental representations just lead to a vicious regress of explanations [Margolis/Laurence] |
11123 | Maybe the concept CAT is just the ability to discriminate and infer about cats [Margolis/Laurence] |
11125 | The abilities view cannot explain the productivity of thought, or mental processes [Margolis/Laurence] |
11140 | Concept-structure explains typicality, categories, development, reference and composition [Margolis/Laurence] |
11128 | Classically, concepts give necessary and sufficient conditions for falling under them [Margolis/Laurence] |
11130 | Typicality challenges the classical view; we see better fruit-prototypes in apples than in plums [Margolis/Laurence] |
11129 | The classical theory explains acquisition, categorization and reference [Margolis/Laurence] |
11131 | It may be that our concepts (such as 'knowledge') have no definitional structure [Margolis/Laurence] |
11132 | The prototype theory is probabilistic, picking something out if it has sufficient of the properties [Margolis/Laurence] |
11133 | Prototype theory categorises by computing the number of shared constituents [Margolis/Laurence] |
11134 | People don't just categorise by apparent similarities [Margolis/Laurence] |
11135 | Complex concepts have emergent properties not in the ingredient prototypes [Margolis/Laurence] |
11136 | Many complex concepts obviously have no prototype [Margolis/Laurence] |
11137 | The theory theory of concepts says they are parts of theories, defined by their roles [Margolis/Laurence] |
11138 | The theory theory is holistic, so how can people have identical concepts? [Margolis/Laurence] |
11139 | Maybe concepts have no structure, and determined by relations to the world, not to other concepts [Margolis/Laurence] |
11146 | People can formulate new concepts which are only named later [Margolis/Laurence] |
7590 | Consequentialism emphasises value rather than obligation in morality [Scruton] |
1838 | Cyrenaic pleasure is a motion, but Epicurean pleasure is a condition [Diog. Laertius] |
1769 | Cynics believe that when a man wishes for nothing he is like the gods [Diog. Laertius] |
7589 | Altruism is either emotional (where your interests are mine) or moral (where they are reasons for me) [Scruton] |
7595 | The idea of a right seems fairly basic; justice may be the disposition to accord rights to people [Scruton] |
7588 | Allegiance is fundamental to the conservative view of society [Scruton] |
7594 | Democrats are committed to a belief and to its opposite, if the majority prefer the latter [Scruton] |
7593 | Liberals focus on universal human freedom, natural rights, and tolerance [Scruton, by PG] |
7592 | For positivists law is a matter of form, for naturalists it is a matter of content [Scruton] |
7587 | The issue of abortion seems insoluble, because there is nothing with which to compare it [Scruton] |