Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Animal Rights and Wrongs', 'The Causal Theory of Names' and 'God and Human Attributes'

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43 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes [Evans]
How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation? [Evans]
A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public [Evans]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
Having beliefs involves recognition, expectation and surprise [Scruton]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / f. Animal beliefs
If an animal has beliefs, that implies not only that it can make mistakes, but that it can learn from them [Scruton]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Perception (which involves an assessment) is a higher state than sensation [Scruton]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
There is consciousness whenever behaviour must be explained in terms of mental activity [Scruton]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 2. Persons as Responsible
Our concept of a person is derived from Roman law [Scruton]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Conditioning may change behaviour without changing the mind [Scruton]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
An emotion is a motive which is also a feeling [Scruton]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / c. Animal rationality
Do we use reason to distinguish people from animals, or use that difference to define reason? [Scruton]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information [Evans]
The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it [Evans]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit [Evans]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people [Evans]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs [Evans]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
All moral life depends ultimately on piety, which is our recognition of our own dependence [Scruton]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
Kant's Moral Law is the rules rational beings would accept when trying to live by agreement [Scruton]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The modern virtues are courage, prudence, wisdom, temperance, justice, charity and loyalty [Scruton]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
Only just people will drop their own self-interests when faced with an impartial verdict [Scruton]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
Sympathy can undermine the moral order just as much as crime does [Scruton]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
That which can only be done by a callous person, ought not to be done [Scruton]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
As soon as we drop self-interest and judge impartially, we find ourselves agreeing about conflicts [Scruton]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism merely guides us (by means of sympathy) when the moral law is silent [Scruton]
Morality is not a sort of calculation, it is what sets the limits to when calculation is appropriate [Scruton]
Utilitarianism says we can't blame Stalin yet, but such a theory is a sick joke [Scruton]
Utilitarianism is wrong precisely because it can't distinguish animals from people [Scruton]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
We favour our own animals over foreign ones because we see them as fellow citizens [Scruton]
Animals command our sympathy and moral concern initially because of their intentionality [Scruton]
Letting your dog kill wild rats, and keeping rats for your dog to kill, are very different [Scruton]
Many of the stranger forms of life (e.g. worms) interest us only as a species, not as individuals [Scruton]
An animal has individuality if it is nameable, and advanced animals can respond to their name [Scruton]
I may avoid stepping on a spider or flower, but fellow-feeling makes me protect a rabbit [Scruton]
Lucky animals are eaten by large predators, the less lucky starve, and worst is death by small predators [Scruton]
We can easily remove the risk of suffering from an animal's life, but we shouldn't do it [Scruton]
Sheep and cattle live comfortable lives, and die an enviably easy death [Scruton]
Concern for one animal may harm the species, if the individual is part of a bigger problem [Scruton]
Animals are outside the community of rights, but we still have duties towards them [Scruton]
Brutal animal sports are banned because they harm the personality of the watcher [Scruton]
Many breeds of animals have needs which our own ancestors planted in them [Scruton]
Introducing a natural means of controlling animal population may not be very compassionate [Scruton]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / c. Moral Argument
God must be fit for worship, but worship abandons morally autonomy, but there is no God [Rachels, by Davies,B]