Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey', 'Science without Numbers' and 'On the Heavens'

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62 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / c. Philosophy as generalisation
Philosophy aims to provide a theory of everything [Scruton]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 3. Analysis of Preconditions
If p entails q, then p is sufficient for q, and q is necessary for p [Scruton]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
A very hungry man cannot choose between equidistant piles of food [Aristotle]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 4. Open Question
We may define 'good' correctly, but then ask whether the application of the definition is good [Scruton]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
A true proposition is consistent with every other true proposition [Scruton]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
The pragmatist does not really have a theory of truth [Scruton]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
In Field's Platonist view, set theory is false because it asserts existence for non-existent things [Field,H, by Chihara]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
Logical consequence is defined by the impossibility of P and ¬q [Field,H, by Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
In Field's version of science, space-time points replace real numbers [Field,H, by Szabó]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Could you be intellectually acquainted with numbers, but unable to count objects? [Scruton]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
'Metric' axioms uses functions, points and numbers; 'synthetic' axioms give facts about space [Field,H]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
The Indispensability Argument is the only serious ground for the existence of mathematical entities [Field,H]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 3. Mathematical Nominalism
Nominalists try to only refer to physical objects, or language, or mental constructions [Field,H]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics
The application of mathematics only needs its possibility, not its truth [Field,H, by Shapiro]
Hilbert explains geometry, by non-numerical facts about space [Field,H]
Field needs a semantical notion of second-order consequence, and that needs sets [Brown,JR on Field,H]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
It seems impossible to explain the idea that the conclusion is contained in the premises [Field,H]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 9. Fictional Mathematics
Abstractions can form useful counterparts to concrete statements [Field,H]
Mathematics is only empirical as regards which theory is useful [Field,H]
Why regard standard mathematics as truths, rather than as interesting fictions? [Field,H]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
If maths contains unprovable truths, then maths cannot be reduced to a set of proofs [Scruton]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
You can reduce ontological commitment by expanding the logic [Field,H]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
If possible worlds are needed to define properties, maybe we should abandon properties [Scruton]
Field presumes properties can be eliminated from science [Field,H, by Szabó]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / d. Problems with abstracta
Abstract objects are only applicable to the world if they are impure, and connect to the physical [Field,H]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Hume assumes that necessity can only be de dicto, not de re [Scruton]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
The conceivable can't be a test of the possible, if there are things which are possible but inconceivable [Scruton]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Epistemology is about the justification of belief, not the definition of knowledge [Scruton]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
In the Cogito argument consciousness develops into self-consciousness [Scruton]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
Maybe our knowledge of truth and causation is synthetic a priori [Scruton]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
Touch only seems to reveal primary qualities [Scruton]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique
We only conceive of primary qualities as attached to secondary qualities [Scruton]
If primary and secondary qualities are distinct, what has the secondary qualities? [Scruton]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
The representational theory says perceptual states are intentional states [Scruton]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
My belief that it will rain tomorrow can't be caused by its raining tomorrow [Scruton]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Logical positivism avoids scepticism, by closing the gap between evidence and conclusion [Scruton]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
Why should you believe someone who says there are no truths? [Scruton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Beneath every extrinsic explanation there is an intrinsic explanation [Field,H]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
Every event having a cause, and every event being determined by its cause, are not the same [Scruton]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
The very concept of a substance denies the possibility of mutual interaction and dependence [Scruton]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 4. Abstracta by Example
'Abstract' is unclear, but numbers, functions and sets are clearly abstract [Field,H]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
Wittgenstein makes it impossible to build foundations from something that is totally private [Scruton]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / b. Successful function
Each thing that has a function is for the sake of that function [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 5. Free Rider
Any social theory of morality has the problem of the 'free rider', who only pretends to join in [Scruton]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
Membership is the greatest source of obligation [Scruton]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
The categorical imperative is not just individual, but can be used for negotiations between strangers [Scruton]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
An unworn sandal is in vain, but nothing in nature is in vain [Aristotle]
There has to be some goal, and not just movement to infinity [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
Aether moves in circles and is imperishable; the four elements perish, and move in straight lines [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
An element is what bodies are analysed into, and won't itself divide into something else [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
'Cause' used to just mean any valid explanation [Scruton]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
If the more you raise some earth the faster it moves, why does the whole earth not move? [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / b. Fields
In theories of fields, space-time points or regions are causal agents [Field,H]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 1. Void
Void is a kind of place, so it can't explain place [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
Measuring space requires no movement while I do it [Scruton]
Both philosophy and physics now make substantivalism more attractive [Field,H]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 5. Relational Space
Relational space is problematic if you take the idea of a field seriously [Field,H]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
The earth must be round and of limited size, because moving north or south makes different stars visible [Aristotle]
The Earth must be spherical, because it casts a convex shadow on the moon [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 3. The Beginning
Everyone agrees that the world had a beginning, but thinkers disagree over whether it will end [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 10. Multiverse
It seems possible that there exists a limited number of other worlds apart from this one [Aristotle]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
'Existence' is not a predicate of 'man', but of the concept of man, saying it has at least one instance [Scruton]