37 ideas
| 22338 | An unexamined life can be virtuous [Murdoch] |
| 22337 | Philosophy must keep returning to the beginning [Murdoch] |
| 23563 | Philosophy moves continually between elaborate theories and the obvious facts [Murdoch] |
| 18486 | We might define truth as arising from the truth-maker relation [MacBride] |
| 18484 | Phenomenalists, behaviourists and presentists can't supply credible truth-makers [MacBride] |
| 18466 | If truthmaking is classical entailment, then anything whatsoever makes a necessary truth [MacBride] |
| 18473 | 'Maximalism' says every truth has an actual truthmaker [MacBride] |
| 18481 | Maximalism follows Russell, and optimalism (no negative or universal truthmakers) follows Wittgenstein [MacBride] |
| 18483 | The main idea of truth-making is that what a proposition is about is what matters [MacBride] |
| 18479 | There are different types of truthmakers for different types of negative truth [MacBride] |
| 18477 | There aren't enough positive states out there to support all the negative truths [MacBride] |
| 18482 | Optimalists say that negative and universal are true 'by default' from the positive truths [MacBride] |
| 18474 | Does 'this sentence has no truth-maker' have a truth-maker? Reductio suggests it can't have [MacBride] |
| 18485 | Even idealists could accept truthmakers, as mind-dependent [MacBride] |
| 18490 | Maybe 'makes true' is not an active verb, but just a formal connective like 'because'? [MacBride] |
| 18493 | Truthmaker talk of 'something' making sentences true, which presupposes objectual quantification [MacBride] |
| 18489 | Connectives link sentences without linking their meanings [MacBride] |
| 18476 | 'A is F' may not be positive ('is dead'), and 'A is not-F' may not be negative ('is not blind') [MacBride] |
| 18480 | Maybe it only exists if it is a truthmaker (rather than the value of a variable)? [MacBride] |
| 18471 | Different types of 'grounding' seem to have no more than a family resemblance relation [MacBride] |
| 18472 | Which has priority - 'grounding' or 'truth-making'? [MacBride] |
| 18475 | Russell allows some complex facts, but Wittgenstein only allows atomic facts [MacBride] |
| 18478 | Wittgenstein's plan to show there is only logical necessity failed, because of colours [MacBride] |
| 12165 | Romantics say music expresses ideas, or the Will, or intuitions, or feelings [Scruton] |
| 22341 | Literature is the most important aspect of culture, because it teaches understanding of living [Murdoch] |
| 12164 | Expressing melancholy is a good thing, but arousing it is a bad thing [Scruton] |
| 22347 | Appreciating beauty in art or nature opens up the good life, by restricting selfishness [Murdoch] |
| 22339 | Love is a central concept in morals [Murdoch] |
| 22348 | Ordinary human love is good evidence of transcendent goodness [Murdoch] |
| 22343 | If I attend properly I will have no choices [Murdoch] |
| 22349 | Art trains us in the love of virtue [Murdoch] |
| 22340 | It is hard to learn goodness from others, because their virtues are part of their personal history [Murdoch] |
| 22350 | Only trivial virtues can be possessed on their own [Murdoch] |
| 22346 | Moral reflection and experience gradually reveals unity in the moral world [Murdoch] |
| 22342 | Kantian existentialists care greatly for reasons for action, whereas Surrealists care nothing [Murdoch] |
| 22351 | Only a philosopher might think choices create values [Murdoch] |
| 22345 | Moral philosophy needs a central concept with all the traditional attributes of God [Murdoch] |