75 ideas
3879 | Philosophy aims to provide a theory of everything [Scruton] |
3891 | If p entails q, then p is sufficient for q, and q is necessary for p [Scruton] |
22024 | Fichte's subjectivity struggles to then give any account of objectivity [Pinkard on Fichte] |
3894 | We may define 'good' correctly, but then ask whether the application of the definition is good [Scruton] |
3883 | A true proposition is consistent with every other true proposition [Scruton] |
22309 | An idea can only be like another idea [Berkeley] |
3884 | The pragmatist does not really have a theory of truth [Scruton] |
22017 | Normativity needs the possibility of negation, in affirmation and denial [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
3907 | Could you be intellectually acquainted with numbers, but unable to count objects? [Scruton] |
3908 | If maths contains unprovable truths, then maths cannot be reduced to a set of proofs [Scruton] |
6717 | Abstract ideas are impossible [Berkeley] |
18876 | Berkeley does believe in trees, but is confused about what trees are [Berkeley, by Cameron] |
3906 | If possible worlds are needed to define properties, maybe we should abandon properties [Scruton] |
6715 | Universals do not have single meaning, but attach to many different particulars [Berkeley] |
6719 | No one will think of abstractions if they only have particular ideas [Berkeley] |
6714 | Universals do not have any intrinsic properties, but only relations to particulars [Berkeley] |
6729 | Material substance is just general existence which can have properties [Berkeley] |
16636 | A die has no distinct subject, but is merely a name for its modes or accidents [Berkeley] |
3888 | Hume assumes that necessity can only be de dicto, not de re [Scruton] |
22018 | Necessary truths derive from basic assertion and negation [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
3903 | The conceivable can't be a test of the possible, if there are things which are possible but inconceivable [Scruton] |
3897 | Epistemology is about the justification of belief, not the definition of knowledge [Scruton] |
3881 | In the Cogito argument consciousness develops into self-consciousness [Scruton] |
6722 | Perception is existence for my table, but also possible perception, by me or a spirit [Berkeley] |
22064 | Fichte's logic is much too narrow, and doesn't deduce ethics, art, society or life [Schlegel,F on Fichte] |
6723 | The 'esse' of objects is 'percipi', and they can only exist in minds [Berkeley] |
6732 | When I shut my eyes, the things I saw may still exist, but in another mind [Berkeley] |
6724 | The only substance is spirit, or that which perceives [Berkeley] |
22032 | Fichte's key claim was that the subjective-objective distinction must itself be subjective [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
3887 | Maybe our knowledge of truth and causation is synthetic a priori [Scruton] |
3901 | Touch only seems to reveal primary qualities [Scruton] |
3885 | We only conceive of primary qualities as attached to secondary qualities [Scruton] |
6726 | No one can, by abstraction, conceive extension and motion of bodies without sensible qualities [Berkeley] |
6728 | Motion is in the mind, since swifter ideas produce an appearance of slower motion [Berkeley] |
6727 | Figure and extension seem just as dependent on the observer as heat and cold [Berkeley] |
3910 | If primary and secondary qualities are distinct, what has the secondary qualities? [Scruton] |
6495 | Berkeley's idealism resulted from fear of scepticism in representative realism [Robinson,H on Berkeley] |
3899 | The representational theory says perceptual states are intentional states [Scruton] |
6720 | Knowledge is of ideas from senses, or ideas of the mind, or operations on sensations [Berkeley] |
3898 | My belief that it will rain tomorrow can't be caused by its raining tomorrow [Scruton] |
3880 | Logical positivism avoids scepticism, by closing the gap between evidence and conclusion [Scruton] |
3878 | Why should you believe someone who says there are no truths? [Scruton] |
23636 | Berkeley's idealism gives no grounds for believing in other minds [Reid on Berkeley] |
22020 | We only see ourselves as self-conscious and rational in relation to other rationalities [Fichte] |
6736 | I know other minds by ideas which are referred by me to other agents, as their effects [Berkeley] |
6713 | If animals have ideas, and are not machines, they must have some reason [Berkeley] |
6491 | Berkeley replaced intentionality with an anti-abstractionist imagist theory of thought [Berkeley, by Robinson,H] |
6711 | The mind creates abstract ideas by considering qualities separated from their objects [Berkeley] |
10581 | I can only combine particulars in imagination; I can't create 'abstract' ideas [Berkeley] |
22060 | The Self is the spontaneity, self-relatedness and unity needed for knowledge [Fichte, by Siep] |
22066 | Novalis sought a much wider concept of the ego than Fichte's proposal [Novalis on Fichte] |
22016 | The self is not a 'thing', but what emerges from an assertion of normativity [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
22019 | Consciousness of an object always entails awareness of the self [Fichte] |
6721 | Ideas are perceived by the mind, soul or self [Berkeley] |
3892 | Every event having a cause, and every event being determined by its cause, are not the same [Scruton] |
3911 | The very concept of a substance denies the possibility of mutual interaction and dependence [Scruton] |
22061 | Judgement is distinguishing concepts, and seeing their relations [Fichte, by Siep] |
6716 | Language is presumably for communication, and names stand for ideas [Berkeley] |
6718 | I can't really go wrong if I stick to wordless thought [Berkeley] |
3882 | Wittgenstein makes it impossible to build foundations from something that is totally private [Scruton] |
22023 | Fichte's idea of spontaneity implied that nothing counts unless we give it status [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
3896 | Any social theory of morality has the problem of the 'free rider', who only pretends to join in [Scruton] |
3886 | Membership is the greatest source of obligation [Scruton] |
3895 | The categorical imperative is not just individual, but can be used for negotiations between strangers [Scruton] |
22065 | Fichte reduces nature to a lifeless immobility [Schlegel,F on Fichte] |
6731 | No one can explain how matter affects mind, so matter is redundant in philosophy [Berkeley] |
3890 | 'Cause' used to just mean any valid explanation [Scruton] |
6730 | We discover natural behaviour by observing settled laws of nature, not necessary connections [Berkeley] |
15861 | The laws of nature are mental regularities which we learn by experience [Berkeley] |
6734 | If properties and qualities arise from an inward essence, we will remain ignorant of nature [Berkeley] |
6735 | All motion is relative, so a single body cannot move [Berkeley] |
3904 | Measuring space requires no movement while I do it [Scruton] |
6733 | I cannot imagine time apart from the flow of ideas in my mind [Berkeley] |
3905 | 'Existence' is not a predicate of 'man', but of the concept of man, saying it has at least one instance [Scruton] |
6737 | Particular evils are really good when linked to the whole system of beings [Berkeley] |