54 ideas
11912 | Substantive metaphysics says what a property is, not what a predicate means [Molnar] |
11920 | A real definition gives all the properties that constitute an identity [Molnar] |
11919 | Ontological dependence rests on essential connection, not necessary connection [Molnar] |
11929 | The three categories in ontology are objects, properties and relations [Molnar] |
11927 | Reflexive relations are syntactically polyadic but ontologically monadic [Molnar] |
11915 | If atomism is true, then all properties derive from ultimate properties [Molnar] |
11916 | 'Being physical' is a second-order property [Molnar] |
11956 | 'Categorical properties' are those which are not powers [Molnar] |
11928 | Are tropes transferable? If they are, that is a version of Platonism [Molnar] |
11933 | A power's type-identity is given by its definitive manifestation [Molnar] |
11932 | Powers have Directedness, Independence, Actuality, Intrinsicality and Objectivity [Molnar] |
11934 | The physical world has a feature very like mental intentionality [Molnar] |
11947 | Dispositions and external powers arise entirely from intrinsic powers in objects [Molnar] |
11952 | The Standard Model suggest that particles are entirely dispositional, and hence are powers [Molnar] |
11953 | Some powers are ungrounded, and others rest on them, and are derivative [Molnar] |
11943 | Dispositions can be causes, so they must be part of the actual world [Molnar] |
11939 | If powers only exist when actual, they seem to be nomadic, and indistinguishable from non-powers [Molnar] |
11914 | Platonic explanations of universals actually diminish our understanding [Molnar] |
11913 | For nominalists, predicate extensions are inexplicable facts [Molnar] |
11962 | Nominalists only accept first-order logic [Molnar] |
11917 | Structural properties are derivate properties [Molnar] |
11955 | There are no 'structural properties', as properties with parts [Molnar] |
11918 | The essence of a thing need not include everything that is necessarily true of it [Molnar] |
11963 | What is the truthmaker for a non-existent possible? [Molnar] |
5303 | For the proletariate, law, morality and religion are just expressions of bourgeois interests [Marx/Engels] |
11951 | Hume allows interpolation, even though it and extrapolation are not actually valid [Molnar] |
11936 | The two ways proposed to distinguish mind are intentionality or consciousness [Molnar] |
11935 | Physical powers like solubility and charge also have directedness [Molnar] |
11944 | Rule occasionalism says God's actions follow laws, not miracles [Molnar] |
21998 | Bourgeois interests create our morality, law and religion [Marx/Engels] |
7590 | Consequentialism emphasises value rather than obligation in morality [Scruton] |
7589 | Altruism is either emotional (where your interests are mine) or moral (where they are reasons for me) [Scruton] |
7595 | The idea of a right seems fairly basic; justice may be the disposition to accord rights to people [Scruton] |
7588 | Allegiance is fundamental to the conservative view of society [Scruton] |
7594 | Democrats are committed to a belief and to its opposite, if the majority prefer the latter [Scruton] |
7593 | Liberals focus on universal human freedom, natural rights, and tolerance [Scruton, by PG] |
5302 | Modern governments are just bourgeois management committees [Marx/Engels] |
5304 | Communism aims to abolish not all property, but bourgeois property [Marx/Engels] |
5307 | Many of the bourgeois rights grievances are a form of self-defence [Marx/Engels] |
5306 | The free development of each should be the condition for the free development of all [Marx/Engels] |
7592 | For positivists law is a matter of form, for naturalists it is a matter of content [Scruton] |
5305 | Communists want to rescue education from the ruling class [Marx/Engels] |
5301 | The history of all existing society is the history of class struggles [Marx/Engels] |
7587 | The issue of abortion seems insoluble, because there is nothing with which to compare it [Scruton] |
11960 | Singular causation is prior to general causation; each aspirin produces the aspirin generalization [Molnar] |
11937 | We should analyse causation in terms of powers, not vice versa [Molnar] |
11954 | We should analyse causation in terms of powers [Molnar] |
11961 | Causal dependence explains counterfactual dependence, not vice versa [Molnar] |
11959 | Science works when we assume natural kinds have essences - because it is true [Molnar] |
9448 | Location in space and time are non-power properties [Molnar, by Mumford] |
11930 | One essential property of a muon doesn't entail the others [Molnar] |
11957 | It is contingent which kinds and powers exist in the world [Molnar] |
11921 | The laws of nature depend on the powers, not the other way round [Molnar] |
11931 | Energy fields are discontinuous at the very small [Molnar] |