32 ideas
8525 | Relations need terms, so they must be second-order entities based on first-order tropes [Campbell,K] |
8518 | Events are trope-sequences, in which tropes replace one another [Campbell,K] |
8513 | Two red cloths are separate instances of redness, because you can dye one of them blue [Campbell,K] |
8514 | Red could only recur in a variety of objects if it was many, which makes them particulars [Campbell,K] |
8522 | Tropes solve the Companionship Difficulty, since the resemblance is only between abstract particulars [Campbell,K] |
8523 | Tropes solve the Imperfect Community problem, as they can only resemble in one respect [Campbell,K] |
8524 | Trope theory makes space central to reality, as tropes must have a shape and size [Campbell,K] |
8521 | Nominalism has the problem that without humans nothing would resemble anything else [Campbell,K] |
8515 | Tropes are basic particulars, so concrete particulars are collections of co-located tropes [Campbell,K] |
8519 | Bundles must be unique, so the Identity of Indiscernibles is a necessity - which it isn't! [Campbell,K] |
4033 | Two pure spheres in non-absolute space are identical but indiscernible [Campbell,K] |
8512 | Abstractions come before the mind by concentrating on a part of what is presented [Campbell,K] |
2705 | How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare] |
2712 | You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare] |
2706 | Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare] |
2708 | An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare] |
2704 | If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare] |
2703 | Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare] |
2707 | If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare] |
2709 | Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare] |
2711 | Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare] |
7590 | Consequentialism emphasises value rather than obligation in morality [Scruton] |
7589 | Altruism is either emotional (where your interests are mine) or moral (where they are reasons for me) [Scruton] |
2710 | Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare] |
7595 | The idea of a right seems fairly basic; justice may be the disposition to accord rights to people [Scruton] |
7588 | Allegiance is fundamental to the conservative view of society [Scruton] |
7594 | Democrats are committed to a belief and to its opposite, if the majority prefer the latter [Scruton] |
7593 | Liberals focus on universal human freedom, natural rights, and tolerance [Scruton, by PG] |
7592 | For positivists law is a matter of form, for naturalists it is a matter of content [Scruton] |
7587 | The issue of abortion seems insoluble, because there is nothing with which to compare it [Scruton] |
8516 | Davidson can't explain causation entirely by events, because conditions are also involved [Campbell,K] |
8517 | Causal conditions are particular abstract instances of properties, which makes them tropes [Campbell,K] |