20 ideas
| 18543 | Do aesthetic reasons count as reasons, if they are rejectable without contradiction? [Scruton] |
| 18542 | Defining truth presupposes that there can be a true definition [Scruton] |
| 10429 | It is best to say that a name designates iff there is something for it to designate [Sainsbury] |
| 10425 | Definite descriptions may not be referring expressions, since they can fail to refer [Sainsbury] |
| 10438 | Definite descriptions are usually rigid in subject, but not in predicate, position [Sainsbury] |
| 2602 | What experience could prove 'If a=c and b=c then a=b'? [Descartes] |
| 2600 | The mind's innate ideas are part of its capacity for thought [Descartes] |
| 2601 | Qualia must be innate, because physical motions do not contain them [Descartes] |
| 10432 | A new usage of a name could arise from a mistaken baptism of nothing [Sainsbury] |
| 10434 | Even a quantifier like 'someone' can be used referentially [Sainsbury] |
| 18546 | The pleasure taken in beauty also aims at understanding and valuing [Scruton] |
| 18550 | Art gives us imaginary worlds which we can view impartially [Scruton] |
| 18544 | Maybe 'beauty' is too loaded, and we should talk of fittingness or harmony [Scruton] |
| 18553 | Beauty shows us what we should want in order to achieve human fulfilment [Scruton] |
| 18556 | Beauty is rationally founded, inviting meaning, comparison and self-reflection [Scruton] |
| 18548 | Natural beauty reassures us that the world is where we belong [Scruton] |
| 18551 | Croce says art makes inarticulate intuitions conscious; rival views say the audience is the main concern [Scruton] |
| 18541 | Beauty (unlike truth and goodness) is questionable as an ultimate value [Scruton] |
| 18554 | Prostitution is wrong because it hardens the soul, since soul and body are one [Scruton] |
| 10431 | Things are thought to have a function, even when they can't perform them [Sainsbury] |