102 ideas
| 3879 | Philosophy aims to provide a theory of everything [Scruton] |
| 3891 | If p entails q, then p is sufficient for q, and q is necessary for p [Scruton] |
| 23917 | Contrary statements can both be reasonable, if they are meant in two different ways [Aristotle] |
| 3894 | We may define 'good' correctly, but then ask whether the application of the definition is good [Scruton] |
| 3883 | A true proposition is consistent with every other true proposition [Scruton] |
| 3593 | The only way to specify the corresponding fact is asserting the sentence [Williams,M] |
| 3585 | Coherence needs positive links, not just absence of conflict [Williams,M] |
| 3584 | Justification needs coherence, while truth might be ideal coherence [Williams,M] |
| 3884 | The pragmatist does not really have a theory of truth [Scruton] |
| 3599 | Deduction shows entailments, not what to believe [Williams,M] |
| 3907 | Could you be intellectually acquainted with numbers, but unable to count objects? [Scruton] |
| 3908 | If maths contains unprovable truths, then maths cannot be reduced to a set of proofs [Scruton] |
| 3906 | If possible worlds are needed to define properties, maybe we should abandon properties [Scruton] |
| 5869 | The thesis of the Form of the Good (or of anything else) is verbal and vacuous [Aristotle] |
| 3888 | Hume assumes that necessity can only be de dicto, not de re [Scruton] |
| 22505 | The two right angles of a triangle necessitate that a quadrilateral has four [Aristotle] |
| 3903 | The conceivable can't be a test of the possible, if there are things which are possible but inconceivable [Scruton] |
| 3897 | Epistemology is about the justification of belief, not the definition of knowledge [Scruton] |
| 22513 | Knowing is having knowledge; understanding is using knowledge [Aristotle] |
| 3591 | We could never pin down how many beliefs we have [Williams,M] |
| 3582 | Propositions make error possible, so basic experiential knowledge is impossible [Williams,M] |
| 3881 | In the Cogito argument consciousness develops into self-consciousness [Scruton] |
| 3592 | Phenomenalism is a form of idealism [Williams,M] |
| 3887 | Maybe our knowledge of truth and causation is synthetic a priori [Scruton] |
| 3901 | Touch only seems to reveal primary qualities [Scruton] |
| 3885 | We only conceive of primary qualities as attached to secondary qualities [Scruton] |
| 3910 | If primary and secondary qualities are distinct, what has the secondary qualities? [Scruton] |
| 3899 | The representational theory says perceptual states are intentional states [Scruton] |
| 3579 | Sense data avoid the danger of misrepresenting the world [Williams,M] |
| 3581 | Sense data can't give us knowledge if they are non-propositional [Williams,M] |
| 3564 | Is it people who are justified, or propositions? [Williams,M] |
| 3595 | What works always takes precedence over theories [Williams,M] |
| 3580 | Experience must be meaningful to act as foundations [Williams,M] |
| 3578 | Are empirical foundations judgements or experiences? [Williams,M] |
| 3576 | Foundationalists are torn between adequacy and security [Williams,M] |
| 3577 | Strong justification eliminates error, but also reduces our true beliefs [Williams,M] |
| 3589 | Why should diverse parts of our knowledge be connected? [Williams,M] |
| 3590 | Coherence theory must give a foundational status to coherence itself [Williams,M] |
| 3571 | Externalism does not require knowing that you know [Williams,M] |
| 3574 | Externalism ignores the social aspect of knowledge [Williams,M] |
| 3569 | In the causal theory of knowledge the facts must cause the belief [Williams,M] |
| 3567 | How could there be causal relations to mathematical facts? [Williams,M] |
| 3586 | Only a belief can justify a belief [Williams,M] |
| 3898 | My belief that it will rain tomorrow can't be caused by its raining tomorrow [Scruton] |
| 3573 | Externalist reliability refers to a range of conventional conditions [Williams,M] |
| 3565 | Sometimes I ought to distrust sources which are actually reliable [Williams,M] |
| 3566 | We control our beliefs by virtue of how we enquire [Williams,M] |
| 3594 | Scepticism just reveals our limited ability to explain things [Williams,M] |
| 3575 | Scepticism can involve discrepancy, relativity, infinity, assumption and circularity [Williams,M] |
| 3880 | Logical positivism avoids scepticism, by closing the gap between evidence and conclusion [Scruton] |
| 3878 | Why should you believe someone who says there are no truths? [Scruton] |
| 3587 | Seeing electrons in a cloud chamber requires theory [Williams,M] |
| 23906 | Courage from spirit is natural and unconquerable, as seen in the young [Aristotle] |
| 20204 | Whether the mind has parts is irrelevant, since it obviously has distinct capacities [Aristotle] |
| 22506 | A man is the cause of what is within his power, and what he causes is in his power [Aristotle] |
| 22504 | Only a human being can be a starting point for an action [Aristotle] |
| 3892 | Every event having a cause, and every event being determined by its cause, are not the same [Scruton] |
| 3911 | The very concept of a substance denies the possibility of mutual interaction and dependence [Scruton] |
| 22510 | Some emotional states are too strong for human nature [Aristotle] |
| 23913 | Nearly all the good and bad states of character are concerned with feelings [Aristotle] |
| 3588 | Foundationalists base meaning in words, coherentists base it in sentences [Williams,M] |
| 3882 | Wittgenstein makes it impossible to build foundations from something that is totally private [Scruton] |
| 23918 | Akrasia is the clash of two feelings - goodness and pleasure [Aristotle] |
| 22515 | Choice results when deliberation brings together an opinion with an inclination [Aristotle] |
| 22508 | Unlike in inanimate things, in animate things actions have more than one starting point [Aristotle] |
| 22514 | The deliberative part of the soul discerns explanatory causes [Aristotle] |
| 22507 | An action is voluntary when it is accompanied by thought of some kind [Aristotle] |
| 23319 | We are responsible if our actions reflect our motivation [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 22512 | Acts are voluntary if done knowingly, by the agent, and in his power to avoid it [Aristotle] |
| 22509 | What is natural for us is either there at birth, or appears by normal processes [Aristotle] |
| 18230 | No one would choose life just for activities not done for their own sake [Aristotle] |
| 23909 | Wearing a shoe is its intrinsic use, and selling it (as a shoe) is its coincidental use [Aristotle] |
| 5870 | Everything seeks, not a single good, but its own separate good [Aristotle] |
| 5877 | We judge people from their deeds because we cannot see their choices (which matter more) [Aristotle] |
| 5868 | Horses, birds and fish are not happy, lacking a divine aspect to their natures [Aristotle] |
| 5865 | Happiness involves three things, of which the greatest is either wisdom, virtue, or pleasure [Aristotle] |
| 3896 | Any social theory of morality has the problem of the 'free rider', who only pretends to join in [Scruton] |
| 5876 | Virtue is different from continence [Aristotle] |
| 5872 | Excellence is the best state of anything (like a cloak) which has an employment or function [Aristotle] |
| 5875 | Character (éthos) is developed from habit (ethos) [Aristotle] |
| 5874 | Character virtues (such as courage) are of the non-rational part, which follows the rational part [Aristotle] |
| 22516 | Character is shown by what is or is not enjoyed, and virtue chooses the mean among them [Aristotle] |
| 22517 | We judge character not by their actions, but by their reasons for actions [Aristotle] |
| 23914 | People sometimes exhibit both extremes together, but the mean is contrary to both of them [Aristotle] |
| 23911 | Possessors of a virtue tend to despise what reason shows to be its opposite [Aristotle] |
| 23910 | Greatness of soul produces all the virtues - and vice versa [Aristotle] |
| 23908 | If someone just looks at or listens to beautiful things, they would not be thought intemperate [Aristotle] |
| 23905 | Courage follows reason, which tells us to choose what is noble [Aristotle] |
| 23912 | Honour depends on what it is for, and whether it is bestowed by worthy people [Aristotle] |
| 5871 | Goods in the soul are more worthy than those outside it, as everybody wants them [Aristotle] |
| 23920 | Decent people can be friends with base people [Aristotle] |
| 23919 | Friendship cannot be immediate; it takes time, and needs testing [Aristotle] |
| 3886 | Membership is the greatest source of obligation [Scruton] |
| 3895 | The categorical imperative is not just individual, but can be used for negotiations between strangers [Scruton] |
| 23915 | The main function of politics is to produce friendship [Aristotle] |
| 23916 | The best cure for mutual injustice is friendship [Aristotle] |
| 5866 | It is folly not to order one's life around some end [Aristotle] |
| 5878 | Eyes could be used for a natural purpose, or for unnatural seeing, or for a non-seeing activity [Aristotle] |
| 5873 | Each thing's function is its end [Aristotle] |
| 3890 | 'Cause' used to just mean any valid explanation [Scruton] |
| 3904 | Measuring space requires no movement while I do it [Scruton] |
| 3905 | 'Existence' is not a predicate of 'man', but of the concept of man, saying it has at least one instance [Scruton] |