128 ideas
5361 | Philosophers must get used to absurdities [Russell] |
5368 | Philosophy verifies that our hierarchy of instinctive beliefs is harmonious and consistent [Russell] |
5432 | Metaphysics cannot give knowledge of the universe as a whole [Russell] |
5434 | Philosophy is similar to science, and has no special source of wisdom [Russell] |
5396 | Three Laws of Thought: identity, contradiction, and excluded middle [Russell] |
5405 | The law of contradiction is not a 'law of thought', but a belief about things [Russell] |
5420 | Truth is a property of a belief, but dependent on its external relations, not its internal qualities [Russell] |
5419 | Truth and falsehood are properties of beliefs and statements [Russell] |
5417 | A good theory of truth must make falsehood possible [Russell] |
7395 | Truth as congruence may work for complex beliefs, but not for simple beliefs about existence [Joslin on Russell] |
5428 | Beliefs are true if they have corresponding facts, and false if they don't [Russell] |
5421 | The coherence theory says falsehood is failure to cohere, and truth is fitting into a complete system of Truth [Russell] |
5422 | More than one coherent body of beliefs seems possible [Russell] |
5423 | If we suspend the law of contradiction, nothing will appear to be incoherent [Russell] |
5424 | Coherence is not the meaning of truth, but an important test for truth [Russell] |
5401 | The mortality of Socrates is more certain from induction than it is from deduction [Russell] |
10397 | Abelard's mereology involves privileged and natural divisions, and principal parts [Abelard, by King,P] |
5395 | Demonstration always relies on the rule that anything implied by a truth is true [Russell] |
5386 | Proper names are really descriptions, and can be replaced by a description in a person's mind [Russell] |
5385 | The phrase 'a so-and-so' is an 'ambiguous' description'; 'the so-and-so' (singular) is a 'definite' description [Russell] |
5399 | Maths is not known by induction, because further instances are not needed to support it [Russell] |
5370 | Space is neutral between touch and sight, so it cannot really be either of them [Russell] |
5418 | In a world of mere matter there might be 'facts', but no truths [Russell] |
5371 | Because we depend on correspondence, we know relations better than we know the items that relate [Russell] |
5407 | That Edinburgh is north of London is a non-mental fact, so relations are independent universals [Russell] |
5383 | Every complete sentence must contain at least one word (a verb) which stands for a universal [Russell] |
4428 | Propositions express relations (prepositions and verbs) as well as properties (nouns and adjectives) [Russell] |
5406 | Confused views of reality result from thinking that only nouns and adjectives represent universals [Russell] |
4479 | All universals are like the relation "is north of", in having no physical location at all [Russell, by Loux] |
4427 | Every sentence contains at least one word denoting a universal, so we need universals to know truth [Russell] |
4030 | Russell claims that universals are needed to explain a priori knowledge (as their relations) [Russell, by Mellor/Oliver] |
5409 | Normal existence is in time, so we must say that universals 'subsist' [Russell] |
5408 | If we identify whiteness with a thought, we can never think of it twice; whiteness is the object of a thought [Russell] |
10396 | If 'animal' is wholly present in Socrates and an ass, then 'animal' is rational and irrational [Abelard, by King,P] |
10395 | Abelard was an irrealist about virtually everything apart from concrete individuals [Abelard, by King,P] |
4441 | 'Resemblance Nominalism' won't work, because the theory treats resemblance itself as a universal [Russell] |
15384 | Only words can be 'predicated of many'; the universality is just in its mode of signifying [Abelard, by Panaccio] |
4429 | If we consider whiteness to be merely a mental 'idea', we rob it of its universality [Russell] |
8481 | The de dicto-de re modality distinction dates back to Abelard [Abelard, by Orenstein] |
5400 | In any possible world we feel that two and two would be four [Russell] |
5431 | Knowledge cannot be precisely defined, as it merges into 'probable opinion' [Russell] |
4266 | Having beliefs involves recognition, expectation and surprise [Scruton] |
5426 | Belief relates a mind to several things other than itself [Russell] |
5366 | We have an 'instinctive' belief in the external world, prior to all reflection [Russell] |
4265 | If an animal has beliefs, that implies not only that it can make mistakes, but that it can learn from them [Scruton] |
5359 | Descartes showed that subjective things are the most certain [Russell] |
5377 | 'Acquaintance' is direct awareness, without inferences or judgements [Russell] |
6510 | Russell (1912) said phenomena only resemble reality in abstract structure [Russell, by Robinson,H] |
5372 | There is no reason to think that objects have colours [Russell] |
5373 | 'Idealism' says that everything which exists is in some sense mental [Russell] |
5362 | It is not illogical to think that only myself and my mental events exist [Russell] |
5412 | Some propositions are self-evident, but their implications may also be self-evident [Russell] |
5413 | Particular instances are more clearly self-evident than any general principles [Russell] |
5415 | As shown by memory, self-evidence comes in degrees [Russell] |
5416 | If self-evidence has degrees, we should accept the more self-evident as correct [Russell] |
5397 | The rationalists were right, because we know logical principles without experience [Russell] |
4430 | All a priori knowledge deals with the relations of universals [Russell] |
5411 | We can know some general propositions by universals, when no instance can be given [Russell] |
4264 | Perception (which involves an assessment) is a higher state than sensation [Scruton] |
6514 | Russell's representationalism says primary qualities only show the structure of reality [Russell, by Robinson,H] |
6415 | After 1912, Russell said sense-data are last in analysis, not first in experience [Russell, by Grayling] |
5358 | 'Sense-data' are what are immediately known in sensation, such as colours or roughnesses [Russell] |
7290 | If Russell rejects innate ideas and direct a priori knowledge, he is left with a tabula rasa [Russell, by Thompson] |
5357 | It is natural to begin from experience, and presumably that is the basis of knowledge [Russell] |
5382 | We are acquainted with outer and inner sensation, memory, Self, and universals [Russell, by PG] |
5389 | Knowledge by descriptions enables us to transcend private experience [Russell] |
5376 | I can know the existence of something with which nobody is acquainted [Russell] |
5414 | Images are not memory, because they are present, and memories are of the past [Russell] |
5430 | A true belief is not knowledge if it is reached by bad reasoning [Russell] |
5429 | True belief is not knowledge when it is deduced from false belief [Russell] |
5378 | All knowledge (of things and of truths) rests on the foundations of acquaintance [Russell] |
5365 | Dreams can be explained fairly scientifically if we assume a physical world [Russell] |
5391 | Science aims to find uniformities to which (within the limits of experience) there are no exceptions [Russell] |
5394 | We can't prove induction from experience without begging the question [Russell] |
5390 | Chickens are not very good at induction, and are surprised when their feeder wrings their neck [Russell] |
5392 | It doesn't follow that because the future has always resembled the past, that it always will [Russell] |
5363 | If the cat reappears in a new position, presumably it has passed through the intermediate positions [Russell] |
5367 | Belief in real objects makes our account of experience simpler and more systematic [Russell] |
5364 | It is hard not to believe that speaking humans are expressing thoughts, just as we do ourselves [Russell] |
5379 | If we didn't know our own minds by introspection, we couldn't know that other people have minds [Russell] |
4271 | There is consciousness whenever behaviour must be explained in terms of mental activity [Scruton] |
5410 | I learn the universal 'resemblance' by seeing two shades of green, and their contrast with red [Russell] |
4272 | Our concept of a person is derived from Roman law [Scruton] |
5381 | In seeing the sun, we are acquainted with our self, but not as a permanent person [Russell] |
5380 | In perceiving the sun, I am aware of sun sense-data, and of the perceiver of the data [Russell] |
4267 | Conditioning may change behaviour without changing the mind [Scruton] |
4269 | An emotion is a motive which is also a feeling [Scruton] |
5369 | It is rational to believe in reality, despite the lack of demonstrative reasons for it [Russell] |
4270 | Do we use reason to distinguish people from animals, or use that difference to define reason? [Scruton] |
5375 | Knowledge of truths applies to judgements; knowledge by acquaintance applies to sensations and things [Russell] |
21711 | Russell's 'multiple relations' theory says beliefs attach to ingredients, not to propositions [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
5427 | Truth is when a mental state corresponds to a complex unity of external constituents [Russell] |
5425 | In order to explain falsehood, a belief must involve several terms, not two [Russell] |
5384 | A universal of which we are aware is called a 'concept' [Russell] |
15385 | Abelard's problem is the purely singular aspects of things won't account for abstraction [Panaccio on Abelard] |
13468 | Russell started philosophy of language, by declaring some plausible sentences to be meaningless [Russell, by Hart,WD] |
5388 | Every understood proposition is composed of constituents with which we are acquainted [Russell] |
5387 | It is pure chance which descriptions in a person's mind make a name apply to an individual [Russell] |
15383 | Nothing external can truly be predicated of an object [Abelard, by Panaccio] |
21724 | The main aim of the multiple relations theory of judgement was to dispense with propositions [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
4284 | All moral life depends ultimately on piety, which is our recognition of our own dependence [Scruton] |
4273 | Kant's Moral Law is the rules rational beings would accept when trying to live by agreement [Scruton] |
4274 | The modern virtues are courage, prudence, wisdom, temperance, justice, charity and loyalty [Scruton] |
4286 | Only just people will drop their own self-interests when faced with an impartial verdict [Scruton] |
4283 | Sympathy can undermine the moral order just as much as crime does [Scruton] |
4290 | That which can only be done by a callous person, ought not to be done [Scruton] |
4285 | As soon as we drop self-interest and judge impartially, we find ourselves agreeing about conflicts [Scruton] |
4287 | Utilitarianism merely guides us (by means of sympathy) when the moral law is silent [Scruton] |
4282 | Morality is not a sort of calculation, it is what sets the limits to when calculation is appropriate [Scruton] |
4281 | Utilitarianism says we can't blame Stalin yet, but such a theory is a sick joke [Scruton] |
4280 | Utilitarianism is wrong precisely because it can't distinguish animals from people [Scruton] |
5398 | Judgements of usefulness depend on judgements of value [Russell] |
4296 | Brutal animal sports are banned because they harm the personality of the watcher [Scruton] |
4288 | Many breeds of animals have needs which our own ancestors planted in them [Scruton] |
4293 | Introducing a natural means of controlling animal population may not be very compassionate [Scruton] |
4295 | We favour our own animals over foreign ones because we see them as fellow citizens [Scruton] |
4268 | Animals command our sympathy and moral concern initially because of their intentionality [Scruton] |
4291 | Letting your dog kill wild rats, and keeping rats for your dog to kill, are very different [Scruton] |
4263 | Many of the stranger forms of life (e.g. worms) interest us only as a species, not as individuals [Scruton] |
4276 | An animal has individuality if it is nameable, and advanced animals can respond to their name [Scruton] |
4277 | I may avoid stepping on a spider or flower, but fellow-feeling makes me protect a rabbit [Scruton] |
4278 | Lucky animals are eaten by large predators, the less lucky starve, and worst is death by small predators [Scruton] |
4279 | We can easily remove the risk of suffering from an animal's life, but we shouldn't do it [Scruton] |
4289 | Sheep and cattle live comfortable lives, and die an enviably easy death [Scruton] |
4292 | Concern for one animal may harm the species, if the individual is part of a bigger problem [Scruton] |
4294 | Animals are outside the community of rights, but we still have duties towards them [Scruton] |
10398 | Natural kinds are not special; they are just well-defined resemblance collections [Abelard, by King,P] |
5393 | We can't know that our laws are exceptionless, or even that there are any laws [Russell] |