86 ideas
16604 | Philosophy consists of choosing between Plato, Aristotle and Democritus [Pasnau] |
16606 | Original philosophers invariably seek inspiration from past thinkers [Pasnau] |
16586 | The commentaries of Averroes were the leading guide to Aristotle [Pasnau] |
16568 | Modernity begins in the late 12th century, with Averroes's commentaries on Aristotle [Pasnau] |
16653 | Once accidents were seen as real, 'Categories' became the major text for ontology [Pasnau] |
16704 | In 1347, the Church effectively stopped philosophy for the next 300 years [Pasnau] |
16605 | After c.1450 all of Plato was available. Before that, only the first half of 'Timaeus' was known [Pasnau] |
16607 | Renaissance Platonism is peripheral [Pasnau] |
16715 | Plato only made an impact locally in 15th century Italy [Pasnau] |
16610 | Philosophy could easily have died in 17th century, if it weren't for Descartes [Pasnau] |
16781 | The 17th century is a metaphysical train wreck [Pasnau] |
3879 | Philosophy aims to provide a theory of everything [Scruton] |
3891 | If p entails q, then p is sufficient for q, and q is necessary for p [Scruton] |
16677 | Anti-Razor: if you can't account for a truth, keep positing things until you can [Pasnau] |
3894 | We may define 'good' correctly, but then ask whether the application of the definition is good [Scruton] |
3883 | A true proposition is consistent with every other true proposition [Scruton] |
3884 | The pragmatist does not really have a theory of truth [Scruton] |
10163 | Propositional modal logic has been proved to be complete [Kripke, by Feferman/Feferman] |
10760 | With possible worlds, S4 and S5 are sound and complete, but S1-S3 are not even sound [Kripke, by Rossberg] |
16189 | The variable domain approach to quantified modal logic invalidates the Barcan Formula [Kripke, by Simchen] |
15132 | The Barcan formulas fail in models with varying domains [Kripke, by Williamson] |
3907 | Could you be intellectually acquainted with numbers, but unable to count objects? [Scruton] |
3908 | If maths contains unprovable truths, then maths cannot be reduced to a set of proofs [Scruton] |
16598 | Priority was a major topic of dispute for scholastics [Pasnau] |
16727 | In mixtures, the four elements ceased to exist, replaced by a mixed body with a form [Pasnau] |
16732 | 17th C qualities are either microphysical, or phenomenal, or powers [Pasnau] |
16733 | 17th century authors only recognised categorical properties, never dispositions [Pasnau] |
16662 | The biggest question for scholastics is whether properties are real, or modes of substances [Pasnau] |
3906 | If possible worlds are needed to define properties, maybe we should abandon properties [Scruton] |
16767 | There is no centralised power, but we still need essence for a metaphysical understanding [Pasnau] |
16788 | Instead of adding Aristotelian forms to physical stuff, one could add dispositions [Pasnau] |
16738 | Scholastics reject dispositions, because they are not actual, as forms require [Pasnau] |
16649 | Scholastics say there is a genuine thing if it is 'separable' [Pasnau] |
16785 | If you reject essences, questions of individuation become extremely difficult [Pasnau] |
16680 | Scholastics thought Quantity could be the principle of individuation [Pasnau] |
16628 | Corpuscularianism promised a decent account of substance [Pasnau] |
16617 | Corpuscularian critics of scholasticism say only substances exist [Pasnau] |
16741 | Scholastics wanted to treat Aristotelianism as physics, rather than as metaphysics [Pasnau] |
16777 | If crowds are things at all, they seem to be Substances, since they bear properties [Pasnau] |
16615 | Scholastics use 'substantia' for thick concrete entities, and for thin metaphysical ones [Pasnau] |
16775 | For corpuscularians, a substance is just its integral parts [Pasnau] |
16769 | If clay survives destruction of the statue, the statue wasn't a substance, but a mere accident [Pasnau] |
16602 | Corpuscularianism rejected not only form, but also the dependence of matter on form [Pasnau] |
16612 | Hylomorphism may not be a rival to science, but an abstract account of unity and endurance [Pasnau] |
16613 | Hylomorphism declined because scholastics made it into a testable physical theory [Pasnau] |
16747 | Scholastics made forms substantial, in a way unintended by Aristotle [Pasnau] |
16759 | Scholastics began to see substantial form more as Aristotle's 'efficient' cause [Pasnau] |
16748 | Aquinas says a substance has one form; Scotists say it has many forms [Pasnau] |
16671 | Scholastic Quantity either gives a body parts, or spreads them out in a unified way [Pasnau] |
16579 | There may be different types of substrate, or temporary substrates [Pasnau] |
16596 | A substratum can't be 'bare', because it has a job to do [Pasnau] |
16584 | If a substrate gives causal support for change, quite a lot of the ingredients must endure [Pasnau] |
16580 | A substrate may be 'prime matter', which endures through every change [Pasnau] |
16749 | Aristotelians deny that all necessary properties are essential [Pasnau] |
16694 | Typical successive things are time and motion [Pasnau] |
16583 | Weak ex nihilo says it all comes from something; strong version says the old must partly endure [Pasnau] |
3888 | Hume assumes that necessity can only be de dicto, not de re [Scruton] |
3903 | The conceivable can't be a test of the possible, if there are things which are possible but inconceivable [Scruton] |
3897 | Epistemology is about the justification of belief, not the definition of knowledge [Scruton] |
3881 | In the Cogito argument consciousness develops into self-consciousness [Scruton] |
3887 | Maybe our knowledge of truth and causation is synthetic a priori [Scruton] |
3901 | Touch only seems to reveal primary qualities [Scruton] |
3885 | We only conceive of primary qualities as attached to secondary qualities [Scruton] |
3910 | If primary and secondary qualities are distinct, what has the secondary qualities? [Scruton] |
3899 | The representational theory says perceptual states are intentional states [Scruton] |
3898 | My belief that it will rain tomorrow can't be caused by its raining tomorrow [Scruton] |
3880 | Logical positivism avoids scepticism, by closing the gap between evidence and conclusion [Scruton] |
3878 | Why should you believe someone who says there are no truths? [Scruton] |
16783 | Essences must explain, so we can infer them causally from the accidents [Pasnau] |
3892 | Every event having a cause, and every event being determined by its cause, are not the same [Scruton] |
3911 | The very concept of a substance denies the possibility of mutual interaction and dependence [Scruton] |
3882 | Wittgenstein makes it impossible to build foundations from something that is totally private [Scruton] |
3896 | Any social theory of morality has the problem of the 'free rider', who only pretends to join in [Scruton] |
3886 | Membership is the greatest source of obligation [Scruton] |
3895 | The categorical imperative is not just individual, but can be used for negotiations between strangers [Scruton] |
16609 | Atomists say causation is mechanical collisions, and all true qualities are microscopic [Pasnau] |
16603 | In the 17th C matter became body, and was then studied by science [Pasnau] |
16592 | Atomism is the commonest version of corpuscularianism, but isn't required by it [Pasnau] |
16750 | If there are just arrangements of corpuscles, where are the boundaries between substances? [Pasnau] |
3890 | 'Cause' used to just mean any valid explanation [Scruton] |
16722 | Scholastic causation is by changes in the primary qualities of hot, cold, wet, dry [Pasnau] |
16760 | Substantial forms were a step towards scientific essentialism [Pasnau] |
3904 | Measuring space requires no movement while I do it [Scruton] |
16581 | Scholastic authors agree that matter was created by God, out of nothing [Pasnau] |
3905 | 'Existence' is not a predicate of 'man', but of the concept of man, saying it has at least one instance [Scruton] |
16642 | Transubstantion says accidents of bread and wine don't inhere in the substance [Pasnau] |