65 ideas
3879 | Philosophy aims to provide a theory of everything [Scruton] |
3891 | If p entails q, then p is sufficient for q, and q is necessary for p [Scruton] |
6267 | A culture needs to admit that knowledge is more extensive than just 'science' [Putnam] |
6272 | 'True' and 'refers' cannot be made scientically precise, but are fundamental to science [Putnam] |
3894 | We may define 'good' correctly, but then ask whether the application of the definition is good [Scruton] |
6276 | 'The rug is green' might be warrantedly assertible even though the rug is not green [Putnam] |
3883 | A true proposition is consistent with every other true proposition [Scruton] |
6266 | We need the correspondence theory of truth to understand language and science [Putnam] |
6277 | Correspondence between concepts and unconceptualised reality is impossible [Putnam] |
3884 | The pragmatist does not really have a theory of truth [Scruton] |
6264 | In Tarski's definition, you understand 'true' if you accept the notions of the object language [Putnam] |
6265 | Tarski has given a correct account of the formal logic of 'true', but there is more to the concept [Putnam] |
6269 | Only Tarski has found a way to define 'true' [Putnam] |
3907 | Could you be intellectually acquainted with numbers, but unable to count objects? [Scruton] |
3908 | If maths contains unprovable truths, then maths cannot be reduced to a set of proofs [Scruton] |
6280 | Realism is a theory, which explains the convergence of science and the success of language [Putnam] |
3906 | If possible worlds are needed to define properties, maybe we should abandon properties [Scruton] |
17000 | We might fix identities for small particulars, but it is utopian to hope for such things [Kripke] |
11868 | A different piece of wood could have been used for that table; constitution isn't identity [Wiggins on Kripke] |
17044 | A relation can clearly be reflexive, and identity is the smallest reflexive relation [Kripke] |
16999 | A vague identity may seem intransitive, and we might want to talk of 'counterparts' [Kripke] |
17058 | What many people consider merely physically necessary I consider completely necessary [Kripke] |
4970 | What is often held to be mere physical necessity is actually metaphysical necessity [Kripke] |
3888 | Hume assumes that necessity can only be de dicto, not de re [Scruton] |
17059 | Unicorns are vague, so no actual or possible creature could count as a unicorn [Kripke] |
3903 | The conceivable can't be a test of the possible, if there are things which are possible but inconceivable [Scruton] |
4950 | Possible worlds are useful in set theory, but can be very misleading elsewhere [Kripke] |
17003 | Kaplan's 'Dthat' is a useful operator for transforming a description into a rigid designation [Kripke] |
9221 | The best known objection to counterparts is Kripke's, that Humphrey doesn't care if his counterpart wins [Kripke, by Sider] |
3897 | Epistemology is about the justification of belief, not the definition of knowledge [Scruton] |
3881 | In the Cogito argument consciousness develops into self-consciousness [Scruton] |
3887 | Maybe our knowledge of truth and causation is synthetic a priori [Scruton] |
6284 | If a tautology is immune from revision, why would that make it true? [Putnam] |
17052 | The a priori analytic truths involving fixing of reference are contingent [Kripke] |
3901 | Touch only seems to reveal primary qualities [Scruton] |
3885 | We only conceive of primary qualities as attached to secondary qualities [Scruton] |
3910 | If primary and secondary qualities are distinct, what has the secondary qualities? [Scruton] |
3899 | The representational theory says perceptual states are intentional states [Scruton] |
3898 | My belief that it will rain tomorrow can't be caused by its raining tomorrow [Scruton] |
6273 | Knowledge depends on believing others, which must be innate, as inferences are not strong enough [Putnam] |
6274 | Empathy may not give knowledge, but it can give plausibility or right opinion [Putnam] |
3880 | Logical positivism avoids scepticism, by closing the gap between evidence and conclusion [Scruton] |
3878 | Why should you believe someone who says there are no truths? [Scruton] |
17084 | You can't decide which explanations are good if you don't attend to the interest-relative aspects [Putnam] |
4969 | I regard the mind-body problem as wide open, and extremely confusing [Kripke] |
3892 | Every event having a cause, and every event being determined by its cause, are not the same [Scruton] |
3911 | The very concept of a substance denies the possibility of mutual interaction and dependence [Scruton] |
6282 | Theory of meaning presupposes theory of understanding and reference [Putnam] |
6281 | Truth conditions can't explain understanding a sentence, because that in turn needs explanation [Putnam] |
6278 | We should reject the view that truth is prior to meaning [Putnam] |
6271 | How reference is specified is not what reference is [Putnam] |
4956 | A description may fix a reference even when it is not true of its object [Kripke] |
6268 | The claim that scientific terms are incommensurable can be blocked if scientific terms are not descriptions [Putnam] |
17032 | Even if Gödel didn't produce his theorems, he's still called 'Gödel' [Kripke] |
6279 | A private language could work with reference and beliefs, and wouldn't need meaning [Putnam] |
3882 | Wittgenstein makes it impossible to build foundations from something that is totally private [Scruton] |
6270 | The correct translation is the one that explains the speaker's behaviour [Putnam] |
6283 | Language maps the world in many ways (because it maps onto other languages in many ways) [Putnam] |
6275 | You can't say 'most speaker's beliefs are true'; in some areas this is not so, and you can't count beliefs [Putnam] |
3896 | Any social theory of morality has the problem of the 'free rider', who only pretends to join in [Scruton] |
3886 | Membership is the greatest source of obligation [Scruton] |
3895 | The categorical imperative is not just individual, but can be used for negotiations between strangers [Scruton] |
3890 | 'Cause' used to just mean any valid explanation [Scruton] |
3904 | Measuring space requires no movement while I do it [Scruton] |
3905 | 'Existence' is not a predicate of 'man', but of the concept of man, saying it has at least one instance [Scruton] |