26 ideas
21463 | Hamann, Herder and Jacobi were key opponents of the Enlightenment [Gardner] |
21459 | Kant halted rationalism, and forced empiricists to worry about foundations [Gardner] |
12169 | Since only men laugh, it seems to be an attribute of reason [Scruton] |
12172 | Objects of amusement do not have to be real [Scruton] |
12170 | Amusement rests on superiority, or relief, or incongruity [Scruton] |
12173 | The central object of amusement is the human [Scruton] |
21460 | Only Kant and Hegel have united nature, morals, politics, aesthetics and religion [Gardner] |
21443 | Transcendental proofs derive necessities from possibilities (e.g. possibility of experiencing objects) [Gardner] |
21444 | Modern geoemtry is either 'pure' (and formal), or 'applied' (and a posteriori) [Gardner] |
21453 | Leibnizian monads qualify as Kantian noumena [Gardner] |
12174 | Only rational beings are attentive without motive or concern [Scruton] |
20014 | Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall] |
20019 | Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving [Wilson/Schpall] |
20021 | Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it? [Wilson/Schpall] |
20022 | To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall] |
20023 | If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall] |
20025 | We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall] |
20031 | On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires [Wilson/Schpall] |
20028 | Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents [Wilson/Schpall] |
20027 | If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment' [Wilson/Schpall] |
20016 | Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief [Wilson/Schpall] |
20017 | Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief [Wilson/Schpall] |
20018 | Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation [Wilson/Schpall] |
20012 | Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent [Wilson/Schpall] |
20029 | Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall] |
20013 | It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall] |