Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A Dictionary of Political Thought', 'Defeasibility Theory' and 'Interview with Philippa Foot'

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24 ideas

11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
19718 Indefeasibility does not imply infallibility [Grundmann]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
19717 Can a defeater itself be defeated? [Grundmann]
19716 Simple reliabilism can't cope with defeaters of reliably produced beliefs [Grundmann]
19715 You can 'rebut' previous beliefs, 'undercut' the power of evidence, or 'reason-defeat' the truth [Grundmann]
19713 Defeasibility theory needs to exclude defeaters which are true but misleading [Grundmann]
19714 Knowledge requires that there are no facts which would defeat its justification [Grundmann]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
19719 'Moderate' foundationalism has basic justification which is defeasible [Grundmann]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
23438 Full rationality must include morality [Foot]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
23437 Practical reason is goodness in choosing actions [Foot]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
23436 It is an odd Humean view to think a reason to act must always involve caring [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / d. Biological ethics
23431 Human defects are just like plant or animal defects [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
23432 Concepts such as function, welfare, flourishing and interests only apply to living things [Foot]
23433 Humans need courage like a plant needs roots [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
23434 There is no fact-value gap in 'owls should see in the dark' [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
23439 Principles are not ultimate, but arise from the necessities of human life [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
23435 If you demonstrate the reason to act, there is no further question of 'why should I?' [Foot]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
7590 Consequentialism emphasises value rather than obligation in morality [Scruton]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
7589 Altruism is either emotional (where your interests are mine) or moral (where they are reasons for me) [Scruton]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
7595 The idea of a right seems fairly basic; justice may be the disposition to accord rights to people [Scruton]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 3. Conservatism
7588 Allegiance is fundamental to the conservative view of society [Scruton]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / f. Against democracy
7594 Democrats are committed to a belief and to its opposite, if the majority prefer the latter [Scruton]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
7593 Liberals focus on universal human freedom, natural rights, and tolerance [Scruton, by PG]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / d. Legal positivism
7592 For positivists law is a matter of form, for naturalists it is a matter of content [Scruton]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
7587 The issue of abortion seems insoluble, because there is nothing with which to compare it [Scruton]