43 ideas
3879 | Philosophy aims to provide a theory of everything [Scruton] |
3891 | If p entails q, then p is sufficient for q, and q is necessary for p [Scruton] |
3894 | We may define 'good' correctly, but then ask whether the application of the definition is good [Scruton] |
3883 | A true proposition is consistent with every other true proposition [Scruton] |
3884 | The pragmatist does not really have a theory of truth [Scruton] |
10807 | Mathematics reduces to set theory, which reduces, with some mereology, to the singleton function [Lewis] |
10809 | We can accept the null set, but not a null class, a class lacking members [Lewis] |
10811 | The null set plays the role of last resort, for class abstracts and for existence [Lewis] |
10812 | The null set is not a little speck of sheer nothingness, a black hole in Reality [Lewis] |
10813 | What on earth is the relationship between a singleton and an element? [Lewis] |
10814 | Are all singletons exact intrinsic duplicates? [Lewis] |
10806 | Megethology is the result of adding plural quantification to mereology [Lewis] |
10816 | We can use mereology to simulate quantification over relations [Lewis] |
3907 | Could you be intellectually acquainted with numbers, but unable to count objects? [Scruton] |
10808 | Mathematics is generalisations about singleton functions [Lewis] |
10815 | We don't need 'abstract structures' to have structural truths about successor functions [Lewis] |
3908 | If maths contains unprovable truths, then maths cannot be reduced to a set of proofs [Scruton] |
3906 | If possible worlds are needed to define properties, maybe we should abandon properties [Scruton] |
10810 | I say that absolutely any things can have a mereological fusion [Lewis] |
3888 | Hume assumes that necessity can only be de dicto, not de re [Scruton] |
3903 | The conceivable can't be a test of the possible, if there are things which are possible but inconceivable [Scruton] |
3897 | Epistemology is about the justification of belief, not the definition of knowledge [Scruton] |
19701 | Fallibilism is consistent with dogmatism or scepticism, and is not alternative to them [Dougherty] |
19700 | It is best to see the fallibility in the reasons, rather than in the agents or the knowledge [Dougherty] |
19702 | We can't normally say that we know something 'but it might be false' [Dougherty] |
3881 | In the Cogito argument consciousness develops into self-consciousness [Scruton] |
3887 | Maybe our knowledge of truth and causation is synthetic a priori [Scruton] |
3901 | Touch only seems to reveal primary qualities [Scruton] |
3885 | We only conceive of primary qualities as attached to secondary qualities [Scruton] |
3910 | If primary and secondary qualities are distinct, what has the secondary qualities? [Scruton] |
3899 | The representational theory says perceptual states are intentional states [Scruton] |
3898 | My belief that it will rain tomorrow can't be caused by its raining tomorrow [Scruton] |
3880 | Logical positivism avoids scepticism, by closing the gap between evidence and conclusion [Scruton] |
3878 | Why should you believe someone who says there are no truths? [Scruton] |
3892 | Every event having a cause, and every event being determined by its cause, are not the same [Scruton] |
3911 | The very concept of a substance denies the possibility of mutual interaction and dependence [Scruton] |
3882 | Wittgenstein makes it impossible to build foundations from something that is totally private [Scruton] |
3896 | Any social theory of morality has the problem of the 'free rider', who only pretends to join in [Scruton] |
3886 | Membership is the greatest source of obligation [Scruton] |
3895 | The categorical imperative is not just individual, but can be used for negotiations between strangers [Scruton] |
3890 | 'Cause' used to just mean any valid explanation [Scruton] |
3904 | Measuring space requires no movement while I do it [Scruton] |
3905 | 'Existence' is not a predicate of 'man', but of the concept of man, saying it has at least one instance [Scruton] |