Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Public Text and Common Reader', 'On What There Is' and 'The Theodicy'

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50 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 3. Pure Reason
Reasonings have a natural ordering in God's understanding, but only a temporal order in ours [Leibniz]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
We study bound variables not to know reality, but to know what reality language asserts [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / f. Names eliminated
Canonical notation needs quantification, variables and predicates, but not names [Quine, by Orenstein]
Quine extended Russell's defining away of definite descriptions, to also define away names [Quine, by Orenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
Names can be converted to descriptions, and Russell showed how to eliminate those [Quine]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Logicists cheerfully accept reference to bound variables and all sorts of abstract entities [Quine]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
Formalism says maths is built of meaningless notations; these build into rules which have meaning [Quine]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
Intuitionism says classes are invented, and abstract entities are constructed from specified ingredients [Quine]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / c. Conceptualism
Conceptualism holds that there are universals but they are mind-made [Quine]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
For Quine, there is only one way to exist [Quine, by Shapiro]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / g. Particular being
The idea of a thing and the idea of existence are two sides of the same coin [Quine, by Crane]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Quine rests existence on bound variables, because he thinks singular terms can be analysed away [Quine, by Hale]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
Quine's ontology is wrong; his question is scientific, and his answer is partly philosophical [Fine,K on Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
What actually exists does not, of course, depend on language [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
To be is to be the value of a variable, which amounts to being in the range of reference of a pronoun [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
Fictional quantification has no ontology, so we study ontology through scientific theories [Quine, by Orenstein]
An ontology is like a scientific theory; we accept the simplest scheme that fits disorderly experiences [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
If commitment rests on first-order logic, we obviously lose the ontology concerning predication [Maudlin on Quine]
If to be is to be the value of a variable, we must already know the values available [Jacquette on Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Realism, conceptualism and nominalism in medieval universals reappear in maths as logicism, intuitionism and formalism [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
There is no entity called 'redness', and that some things are red is ultimate and irreducible [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
Quine has argued that predicates do not have any ontological commitment [Quine, by Armstrong]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Treating scattered sensations as single objects simplifies our understanding of experience [Quine]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
Quine's indispensability argument said arguments for abstracta were a posteriori [Quine, by Yablo]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
Can an unactualized possible have self-identity, and be distinct from other possibles? [Quine]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
We can never translate our whole language of objects into phenomenalism [Quine]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
Saying we must will whatever we decide to will leads to an infinite regress [Leibniz]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 5. Parallelism
Perfections of soul subordinate the body, but imperfections of soul submit to the body [Leibniz]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
There is an attempt to give a verificationist account of meaning, without the error of reducing everything to sensations [Dennett on Quine]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
The word 'meaning' is only useful when talking about significance or about synonymy [Quine]
I do not believe there is some abstract entity called a 'meaning' which we can 'have' [Quine]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Quine relates predicates to their objects, by being 'true of' them [Quine, by Davidson]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
Will is an inclination to pursue something good [Leibniz]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 3. Taste
Literary meaning emerges in comparisons, and tradition shows which comparisons are relevant [Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 5. Art as Language
In literature, word replacement changes literary meaning [Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 1. Artistic Intentions
Without intentions we can't perceive sculpture, but that is not the whole story [Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 3. Artistic Representation
In aesthetic interest, even what is true is treated as though it were not [Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 5. Objectivism in Art
We can be objective about conventions, but love of art is needed to understand its traditions [Scruton]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
Most people facing death would happily re-live a similar life, with just a bit of variety [Leibniz]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
Metaphysical evil is imperfection; physical evil is suffering; moral evil is sin [Leibniz]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
You can't assess moral actions without referring to the qualities of character that produce them [Leibniz]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
God must be intelligible, to select the actual world from the possibilities [Leibniz]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
The intelligent cause must be unique and all-perfect, to handle all the interconnected possibilities [Leibniz]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality
God prefers men to lions, but might not exterminate lions to save one man [Leibniz]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
If justice is arbitrary, or fixed but not observed, or not human justice, this undermines God [Leibniz]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
God is the first reason of things; our experiences are contingent, and contain no necessity [Leibniz]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
The laws of physics are wonderful evidence of an intelligent and free being [Leibniz]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
Prayers are useful, because God foresaw them in his great plan [Leibniz]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
How can an all-good, wise and powerful being allow evil, sin and apparent injustice? [Leibniz]
Being confident of God's goodness, we disregard the apparent local evils in the visible world [Leibniz]