65 ideas
| 15879 | The Square of Opposition has two contradictory pairs, one contrary pair, and one sub-contrary pair [Harré] |
| 15891 | Traditional quantifiers combine ordinary language generality and ontology assumptions [Harré] |
| 15878 | Some quantifiers, such as 'any', rule out any notion of order within their range [Harré] |
| 15874 | Scientific properties are not observed qualities, but the dispositions which create them [Harré] |
| 15884 | Laws of nature remain the same through any conditions, if the underlying mechanisms are unchanged [Harré] |
| 15880 | In physical sciences particular observations are ordered, but in biology only the classes are ordered [Harré] |
| 15869 | Reports of experiments eliminate the experimenter, and present results as the behaviour of nature [Harré] |
| 15881 | We can save laws from counter-instances by treating the latter as analytic definitions [Harré] |
| 15882 | Since there are three different dimensions for generalising laws, no one system of logic can cover them [Harré] |
| 15888 | The grue problem shows that natural kinds are central to science [Harré] |
| 15887 | 'Grue' introduces a new causal hypothesis - that emeralds can change colour [Harré] |
| 15889 | It is because ravens are birds that their species and their colour might be connected [Harré] |
| 15890 | Non-black non-ravens just aren't part of the presuppositions of 'all ravens are black' [Harré] |
| 15885 | The necessity of Newton's First Law derives from the nature of material things, not from a mechanism [Harré] |
| 15868 | Idealisation idealises all of a thing's properties, but abstraction leaves some of them out [Harré] |
| 18658 | The 'Kantian' self steps back from commitment to its social situation [Kymlicka] |
| 18650 | Teleological theories give the good priority over concern for people [Kymlicka] |
| 18664 | Maybe the particularist moral thought of women is better than the impartial public thinking of men [Kymlicka] |
| 18624 | Utilitarianism is not a decision-procedure; choice of the best procedure is an open question [Kymlicka] |
| 18626 | One view says start with equality, and infer equal weight to interests, and hence maximum utility [Kymlicka] |
| 18627 | A second view says start with maximising the good, implying aggregation, and hence equality [Kymlicka] |
| 18625 | To maximise utility should we double the population, even if life somewhat deteriorates? [Kymlicka] |
| 23262 | Experience, sympathy and history are sensible grounds for laying claim to rights [Grayling] |
| 18638 | The difference principles says we must subsidise the costs of other people's choices [Kymlicka] |
| 18635 | Social contract theories are usually rejected because there never was such a contract [Kymlicka] |
| 23263 | Politics is driven by power cliques [Grayling] |
| 18630 | Utilitarianism is no longer a distinctive political position [Kymlicka] |
| 18623 | The quest of the general good is partly undermined by people's past entitlements [Kymlicka] |
| 18628 | We shouldn't endorse preferences which reject equality, and show prejudice and selfishness [Kymlicka] |
| 18629 | Using utilitarian principles to make decisions encourages cold detachment from people [Kymlicka] |
| 18637 | Utilitarianism is irrational if it tells you to trade in your rights and resources just for benefits [Kymlicka] |
| 23254 | Democracies should require a supermajority for major questions [Grayling] |
| 23255 | It is essential for democracy that voting is free and well informed [Grayling] |
| 23260 | A cap on time of service would restrict party control and career ambitions [Grayling] |
| 23253 | Majority decisions are only acceptable if the minority interests are not vital [Grayling] |
| 18663 | Modern liberalism has added personal privacy to our personal social lives [Kymlicka] |
| 18632 | Liberalism tends to give priority to basic liberties [Kymlicka] |
| 18656 | Marxists say liberalism is unjust, because it allows exploitation in the sale of labour [Kymlicka] |
| 18659 | The 'Kantian' view of the self misses the way it is embedded or situated in society [Kymlicka] |
| 18660 | Communitarians say we should pay more attention to our history [Kymlicka] |
| 18657 | Communitarian states only encourage fairly orthodox ideas of the good life [Kymlicka] |
| 18649 | If everyone owned himself, that would prevent slavery [Kymlicka] |
| 18640 | Libertarians like the free market, but they also think that the free market is just [Kymlicka] |
| 18651 | The most valuable liberties to us need not be the ones with the most freedom [Kymlicka] |
| 18661 | Ancient freedom was free participation in politics, not private independence of life [Kymlicka] |
| 23256 | Liberty and equality cannot be reconciled [Grayling] |
| 18633 | Equal opportunities seems fair, because your fate is from your choices, not your circumstances [Kymlicka] |
| 18634 | Equal opportunity arbitrarily worries about social circumstances, but ignores talents [Kymlicka] |
| 18654 | Marxists say justice is unneeded in the truly good community [Kymlicka] |
| 18652 | The Lockean view of freedom depends on whether you had a right to what is restricted [Kymlicka] |
| 18655 | Justice corrects social faults, but also expresses respect to individuals as ends [Kymlicka] |
| 23258 | The very concept of democracy entails a need for justice [Grayling] |
| 23259 | There should be separate legislative, executive and judicial institutions [Grayling] |
| 15886 | Science rests on the principle that nature is a hierarchy of natural kinds [Harré] |
| 15864 | Classification is just as important as laws in natural science [Harré] |
| 15865 | Newton's First Law cannot be demonstrated experimentally, as that needs absence of external forces [Harré] |
| 15862 | Laws can come from data, from theory, from imagination and concepts, or from procedures [Harré] |
| 15870 | Are laws of nature about events, or types and universals, or dispositions, or all three? [Harré] |
| 15871 | Are laws about what has or might happen, or do they also cover all the possibilities? [Harré] |
| 15876 | Maybe laws of nature are just relations between properties? [Harré] |
| 15860 | We take it that only necessary happenings could be laws [Harré] |
| 15872 | Must laws of nature be universal, or could they be local? [Harré] |
| 15867 | Laws describe abstract idealisations, not the actual mess of nature [Harré] |
| 15892 | Laws of nature state necessary connections of things, events and properties, based on models of mechanisms [Harré] |
| 15875 | In counterfactuals we keep substances constant, and imagine new situations for them [Harré] |