Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Laws of Nature', 'Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86' and 'The Individuation of Events'

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64 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Different abilities are needed for living in an incomplete and undogmatic system [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Bad writers use shapeless floating splotches of concepts [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 3. Hermeneutics
A text has many interpretations, but no 'correct' one [Nietzsche]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
What is the search for truth if it isn't moral? [Nietzsche]
Like all philosophers, I love truth [Nietzsche]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
The Square of Opposition has two contradictory pairs, one contrary pair, and one sub-contrary pair [Harré]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
Logic is a fiction, which invents the view that one thought causes another [Nietzsche]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
Traditional quantifiers combine ordinary language generality and ontology assumptions [Harré]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
Davidson controversially proposed to quantify over events [Davidson, by Engelbretsen]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
Some quantifiers, such as 'any', rule out any notion of order within their range [Harré]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
Numbers enable us to manage the world - to the limits of counting [Nietzsche]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
You can't identify events by causes and effects, as the event needs to be known first [Dummett on Davidson]
Events can only be individuated causally [Davidson, by Schaffer,J]
We need events for action statements, causal statements, explanation, mind-and-body, and adverbs [Davidson, by Bourne]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
Events are just interpretations of groups of appearances [Nietzsche]
The claim that events are individuated by their causal relations to other events is circular [Lowe on Davidson]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
Scientific properties are not observed qualities, but the dispositions which create them [Harré]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
Laws of nature remain the same through any conditions, if the underlying mechanisms are unchanged [Harré]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
The 'I' does not think; it is a construction of thinking, like other useful abstractions [Nietzsche]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Appearance is the sole reality of things, to which all predicates refer [Nietzsche]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
Memory is essential, and is only possible by means of abbreviation signs [Nietzsche]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
Schematic minds think thoughts are truer if they slot into a scheme [Nietzsche]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
Each of our personal drives has its own perspective [Nietzsche]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 1. Observation
In physical sciences particular observations are ordered, but in biology only the classes are ordered [Harré]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
Reports of experiments eliminate the experimenter, and present results as the behaviour of nature [Harré]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 5. Anomalies
We can save laws from counter-instances by treating the latter as analytic definitions [Harré]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Since there are three different dimensions for generalising laws, no one system of logic can cover them [Harré]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
The grue problem shows that natural kinds are central to science [Harré]
'Grue' introduces a new causal hypothesis - that emeralds can change colour [Harré]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / b. Raven paradox
It is because ravens are birds that their species and their colour might be connected [Harré]
Non-black non-ravens just aren't part of the presuppositions of 'all ravens are black' [Harré]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
The necessity of Newton's First Law derives from the nature of material things, not from a mechanism [Harré]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / b. Purpose of mind
The mind is a simplifying apparatus [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
Consciousness is our awareness of our own mental life [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
Minds have an excluding drive to scare things off, and a selecting one to filter facts [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 6. Idealisation
Idealisation idealises all of a thing's properties, but abstraction leaves some of them out [Harré]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 10. Conatus/Striving
The greatest drive of life is to discharge strength, rather than preservation [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
That all events are necessary does not mean they are compelled [Nietzsche]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
Concepts are rough groups of simultaneous sensations [Nietzsche]
Concepts don’t match one thing, but many things a little bit [Nietzsche]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
Whatever their origin, concepts survive by being useful [Nietzsche]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Thought starts as ambiguity, in need of interpretation and narrowing [Nietzsche]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 1. Aesthetics
Aesthetics can be more basic than morality, in our pleasure in certain patterns of experience [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / f. Übermensch
Caesar and Napoleon point to the future, when they pursue their task regardless of human sacrifice [Nietzsche]
Napoleon was very focused, and rightly ignored compassion [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
For the strongest people, nihilism gives you wings! [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
The great question is approaching, of how to govern the earth as a whole [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / d. Elites
The controlling morality of aristocracy is the desire to resemble their ancestors [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 14. Nationalism
People feel united as a nation by one language, but then want a common ancestry and history [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
To be someone you need property, and wanting more is healthy [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
Science rests on the principle that nature is a hierarchy of natural kinds [Harré]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
Classification is just as important as laws in natural science [Harré]
Newton's First Law cannot be demonstrated experimentally, as that needs absence of external forces [Harré]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 2. Types of Laws
Laws can come from data, from theory, from imagination and concepts, or from procedures [Harré]
Are laws of nature about events, or types and universals, or dispositions, or all three? [Harré]
Are laws about what has or might happen, or do they also cover all the possibilities? [Harré]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
Maybe laws of nature are just relations between properties? [Harré]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 7. Strictness of Laws
We take it that only necessary happenings could be laws [Harré]
Must laws of nature be universal, or could they be local? [Harré]
Laws describe abstract idealisations, not the actual mess of nature [Harré]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
Laws of nature state necessary connections of things, events and properties, based on models of mechanisms [Harré]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
In counterfactuals we keep substances constant, and imagine new situations for them [Harré]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
Laws of nature are actually formulas of power relations [Nietzsche]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 1. Chemistry
In chemistry every substance pushes, and thus creates new substances [Nietzsche]