139 ideas
20383 | The wisest man is full of contradictions, and attuned to other people, with occasional harmony [Nietzsche] |
4520 | I don't want to persuade anyone to be a philosopher; they should be rare plants [Nietzsche] |
4545 | Could not the objective character of things be merely a difference of degree within the subjective? [Nietzsche] |
4530 | Reason is a mere idiosyncrasy of a certain species of animal [Nietzsche] |
2463 | A standard naturalist view is realist, externalist, and computationalist, and believes in rationality [Fodor] |
4523 | What can be 'demonstrated' is of little worth [Nietzsche] |
4531 | Our inability to both affirm and deny a single thing is merely an inability, not a 'necessity' [Nietzsche] |
4541 | Everything simple is merely imaginary [Nietzsche] |
20357 | Truth was given value by morality, but eventually turned against its own source [Nietzsche] |
4534 | 'Truth' is the will to be master over the multiplicity of sensations [Nietzsche] |
2435 | Psychology has to include the idea that mental processes are typically truth-preserving [Fodor] |
4548 | Only because there is thought is there untruth [Nietzsche] |
5652 | True beliefs are those which augment one's power [Nietzsche, by Scruton] |
4508 | The truth is what gives us the minimum of spiritual effort, and avoids the exhaustion of lying [Nietzsche] |
4538 | Judgements can't be true and known in isolation; the only surety is in connections and relations [Nietzsche] |
15879 | The Square of Opposition has two contradictory pairs, one contrary pair, and one sub-contrary pair [Harré] |
2442 | Inferences are surely part of the causal structure of the world [Fodor] |
15891 | Traditional quantifiers combine ordinary language generality and ontology assumptions [Harré] |
15878 | Some quantifiers, such as 'any', rule out any notion of order within their range [Harré] |
20361 | We need 'unities' for reckoning, but that does not mean they exist [Nietzsche] |
4533 | Logic and maths refer to fictitious entities which we have created [Nietzsche] |
20359 | The nature of being, of things, is much easier to understand than is becoming [Nietzsche] |
4525 | There are no facts in themselves, only interpretations [Nietzsche] |
4543 | There are no 'facts-in-themselves', since a sense must be projected into them to make them 'facts' [Nietzsche] |
4484 | Nihilism results from valuing the world by the 'categories of reason', because that is fiction [Nietzsche] |
15874 | Scientific properties are not observed qualities, but the dispositions which create them [Harré] |
4546 | We realise that properties are sensations of the feeling subject, not part of the thing [Nietzsche] |
4544 | A thing has no properties if it has no effect on other 'things' [Nietzsche] |
20362 | We saw unity in things because our ego seemed unified (but now we doubt the ego!) [Nietzsche] |
15884 | Laws of nature remain the same through any conditions, if the underlying mechanisms are unchanged [Harré] |
4528 | For me, a priori 'truths' are just provisional assumptions [Nietzsche] |
4537 | We can't know whether there is knowledge if we don't know what it is [Nietzsche] |
4485 | Every belief is a considering-something-true [Nietzsche] |
4487 | A note for asses: What convinces is not necessarily true - it is merely convincing [Nietzsche] |
4539 | The forms of 'knowledge' about logic which precede experience are actually regulations of belief [Nietzsche] |
4529 | All sense perceptions are permeated with value judgements (useful or harmful) [Nietzsche] |
4532 | We can have two opposite sensations, like hard and soft, at the same time [Nietzsche] |
2462 | Control of belief is possible if you know truth conditions and what causes beliefs [Fodor] |
4486 | The extreme view is there are only perspectives, no true beliefs, because there is no true world [Nietzsche] |
15880 | In physical sciences particular observations are ordered, but in biology only the classes are ordered [Harré] |
2461 | An experiment is a deliberate version of what informal thinking does all the time [Fodor] |
2454 | We can deliberately cause ourselves to have true thoughts - hence the value of experiments [Fodor] |
2455 | Interrogation and experiment submit us to having beliefs caused [Fodor] |
15869 | Reports of experiments eliminate the experimenter, and present results as the behaviour of nature [Harré] |
2460 | Participation in an experiment requires agreement about what the outcome will mean [Fodor] |
15881 | We can save laws from counter-instances by treating the latter as analytic definitions [Harré] |
15882 | Since there are three different dimensions for generalising laws, no one system of logic can cover them [Harré] |
2458 | Theories are links in the causal chain between the environment and our beliefs [Fodor] |
15887 | 'Grue' introduces a new causal hypothesis - that emeralds can change colour [Harré] |
15888 | The grue problem shows that natural kinds are central to science [Harré] |
15889 | It is because ravens are birds that their species and their colour might be connected [Harré] |
15890 | Non-black non-ravens just aren't part of the presuppositions of 'all ravens are black' [Harré] |
15885 | The necessity of Newton's First Law derives from the nature of material things, not from a mechanism [Harré] |
2443 | I say psychology is intentional, semantics is informational, and thinking is computation [Fodor] |
4536 | It is a major blunder to think of consciousness as a unity, and hence as an entity, a thing [Nietzsche] |
2453 | We are probably the only creatures that can think about our own thoughts [Fodor] |
15868 | Idealisation idealises all of a thing's properties, but abstraction leaves some of them out [Harré] |
4551 | Great self-examination is to become conscious of oneself not as an individual, but as mankind [Nietzsche] |
4527 | Perhaps we are not single subjects, but a multiplicity of 'cells', interacting to create thought [Nietzsche] |
2446 | Cartesians consider interaction to be a miracle [Fodor] |
2445 | Semantics v syntax is the interaction problem all over again [Fodor] |
20374 | Consciousness is a terminal phenomenon, and causes nothing [Nietzsche] |
2464 | Type physicalism equates mental kinds with physical kinds [Fodor] |
2447 | Hume has no theory of the co-ordination of the mind [Fodor] |
2440 | Propositional attitudes are propositions presented in a certain way [Fodor] |
23938 | Passions are ranked, as if they are non-rational and animal pleasure seeking [Nietzsche] |
23939 | We fail to see that reason is a network of passions, and every passion contains some reason [Nietzsche] |
2450 | Rationality has mental properties - autonomy, productivity, experiment [Fodor] |
2437 | XYZ (Twin Earth 'water') is an impossibility [Fodor] |
2441 | Truth conditions require a broad concept of content [Fodor] |
3114 | Concepts aren't linked to stuff; they are what is caused by stuff [Fodor] |
2452 | Knowing the cause of a thought is almost knowing its content [Fodor] |
2432 | Is content basically information, fixed externally? [Fodor] |
2438 | In the information view, concepts are potentials for making distinctions [Fodor] |
2439 | Semantic externalism says the concept 'elm' needs no further beliefs or inferences [Fodor] |
2457 | If meaning is information, that establishes the causal link between the state of the world and our beliefs [Fodor] |
2451 | To know the content of a thought is to know what would make it true [Fodor] |
2433 | For holists no two thoughts are ever quite the same, which destroys faith in meaning [Fodor] |
2436 | It is claimed that reference doesn't fix sense (Jocasta), and sense doesn't fix reference (Twin Earth) [Fodor] |
2434 | Broad semantics holds that the basic semantic properties are truth and denotation [Fodor] |
2459 | Externalist semantics are necessary to connect the contents of beliefs with how the world is [Fodor] |
4554 | The concept of the 'will' is just a false simplification by our understanding [Nietzsche] |
4552 | There is no such things a pure 'willing' on its own; the aim must always be part of it [Nietzsche] |
4521 | None of the ancients had the courage to deny morality by denying free will [Nietzsche] |
4496 | 'Conscience' is invented to value actions by intention and conformity to 'law', rather than consequences [Nietzsche] |
20136 | There is an extended logic to a great man's life, achieved by a sustained will [Nietzsche] |
20358 | The highest man can endure and control the greatest combination of powerful drives [Nietzsche] |
20369 | The highest man directs the values of the highest natures over millenia [Nietzsche] |
4506 | There is a conspiracy (a will to power) to make morality dominate other values, like knowledge and art [Nietzsche] |
4514 | The basic tendency of the weak has always been to pull down the strong, using morality [Nietzsche] |
20370 | All evaluation is from some perspective, and aims at survival [Nietzsche] |
20354 | The ruling drives of our culture all want to be the highest court of our values [Nietzsche] |
4505 | How can it be that I should prefer my neighbour to myself, but he should prefer me to himself? [Nietzsche] |
4509 | Utilitarians prefer consequences because intentions are unknowable - but so are consequences! [Nietzsche] |
4500 | It is a sign of degeneration when eudaimonistic values begin to prevail [Nietzsche] |
4558 | We have no more right to 'happiness' than worms [Nietzsche] |
4550 | Pleasure and pain are mere epiphenomena, and achievement requires that one desire both [Nietzsche] |
4518 | The question about egoism is: what kind of ego? since not all egos are equal [Nietzsche] |
4519 | The ego is only a fiction, and doesn't exist at all [Nietzsche] |
4517 | Egoism is inescapable, and when it grows weak, the power of love also grows weak [Nietzsche] |
4560 | The Golden Rule prohibits harmful actions, with the premise that actions will be requited [Nietzsche] |
4555 | The great error is to think that happiness derives from virtue, which in turn derives from free will [Nietzsche] |
4494 | Not "return to nature", for there has never yet been a natural humanity [Nietzsche] |
4498 | 'Love your enemy' is unnatural, for the natural law says 'love your neighbour and hate your enemy' [Nietzsche] |
4493 | Be natural! But how, if one happens to be "unnatural"? [Nietzsche] |
4511 | We would avoid a person who always needed reasons for remaining decent [Nietzsche] |
4512 | Virtue is pursued from self-interest and prudence, and reduces people to non-entities [Nietzsche] |
20372 | The instinct of the herd, the majority, aims for the mean, in the middle [Nietzsche] |
4510 | A path to power: to introduce a new virtue under the name of an old one [Nietzsche] |
4515 | Modesty, industriousness, benevolence and temperance are the virtues of a good slave [Nietzsche] |
4516 | Many virtues are merely restraints on the most creative qualities of a human being [Nietzsche] |
4559 | When powerless one desires freedom; if power is too weak, one desires equal power ('justice') [Nietzsche] |
4557 | The supposed great lovers of honour (Alexander etc) were actually great despisers of honour [Nietzsche] |
4507 | The categorical imperative needs either God behind it, or a metaphysic of the unity of reason [Nietzsche] |
4501 | Utilitarianism criticises the origins of morality, but still believes in it as much as Christians [Nietzsche] |
4489 | If faith is lost, people seek other authorities, in order to avoid the risk of willing personal goals [Nietzsche] |
4513 | Virtuous people are inferior because they are not 'persons', but conform to a fixed pattern [Nietzsche] |
4504 | Morality used to be for preservation, but now we can only experiment, giving ourselves moral goals [Nietzsche] |
4495 | The high points of culture and civilization do not coincide [Nietzsche] |
4491 | In modern society virtue is 'equal rights', but only because everyone is zero, so it is a sum of zeroes [Nietzsche] |
15886 | Science rests on the principle that nature is a hierarchy of natural kinds [Harré] |
4542 | Science has taken the meaning out of causation; cause and effect are two equal sides of an equation [Nietzsche] |
4553 | We derive the popular belief in cause and effect from our belief that our free will causes things [Nietzsche] |
15864 | Classification is just as important as laws in natural science [Harré] |
15865 | Newton's First Law cannot be demonstrated experimentally, as that needs absence of external forces [Harré] |
15862 | Laws can come from data, from theory, from imagination and concepts, or from procedures [Harré] |
15870 | Are laws of nature about events, or types and universals, or dispositions, or all three? [Harré] |
15871 | Are laws about what has or might happen, or do they also cover all the possibilities? [Harré] |
15876 | Maybe laws of nature are just relations between properties? [Harré] |
15860 | We take it that only necessary happenings could be laws [Harré] |
15872 | Must laws of nature be universal, or could they be local? [Harré] |
15867 | Laws describe abstract idealisations, not the actual mess of nature [Harré] |
15892 | Laws of nature state necessary connections of things, events and properties, based on models of mechanisms [Harré] |
15875 | In counterfactuals we keep substances constant, and imagine new situations for them [Harré] |
4535 | A 'species' is a stable phase of evolution, implying the false notion that evolution has a goal [Nietzsche] |
4497 | The concept of 'God' represents a turning away from life, and a critique of life [Nietzsche] |
4488 | Those who have abandoned God cling that much more firmly to the faith in morality [Nietzsche] |
4502 | Morality cannot survive when the God who sanctions it is missing [Nietzsche] |
4499 | Primitive Christianity is abolition of the state; it is opposed to defence, justice, patriotism and class [Nietzsche] |