50 ideas
15879 | The Square of Opposition has two contradictory pairs, one contrary pair, and one sub-contrary pair [Harré] |
13258 | The 'aggregative' objections says mereology gets existence and location of objects wrong [Koslicki] |
13288 | Consequence is truth-preserving, either despite substitutions, or in all interpretations [Koslicki] |
14506 | 'Roses are red; therefore, roses are colored' seems truth-preserving, but not valid in a system [Koslicki] |
15891 | Traditional quantifiers combine ordinary language generality and ontology assumptions [Harré] |
15878 | Some quantifiers, such as 'any', rule out any notion of order within their range [Harré] |
14505 | Some questions concern mathematical entities, rather than whole structures [Koslicki] |
13120 | Chisholm divides things into contingent and necessary, and then individuals, states and non-states [Chisholm, by Westerhoff] |
13289 | Structures have positions, constituent types and number, and some invariable parts [Koslicki] |
15874 | Scientific properties are not observed qualities, but the dispositions which create them [Harré] |
14501 | 'Categorical' properties exist in the actual world, and 'hypothetical' properties in other worlds [Koslicki] |
14495 | I aim to put the notion of structure or form back into the concepts of part, whole and object [Koslicki] |
13264 | If a whole is just a structure, a dinner party wouldn't need the guests to turn up [Koslicki] |
14497 | The clay is just a part of the statue (its matter); the rest consists of its form or structure [Koslicki] |
13280 | Statue and clay differ in modal and temporal properties, and in constitution [Koslicki] |
14496 | Structure or form are right at the centre of modern rigorous modes of enquiry [Koslicki] |
13279 | There are at least six versions of constitution being identity [Koslicki] |
14498 | For three-dimensionalist parthood must be a three-place relation, including times [Koslicki] |
13283 | The parts may be the same type as the whole, like a building made of buildings [Koslicki] |
13266 | Wholes in modern mereology are intended to replace sets, so they closely resemble them [Koslicki] |
14500 | Wholes are entities distinct from their parts, and have different properties [Koslicki] |
13281 | Wholes are not just their parts; a whole is an entity distinct from the proper parts [Koslicki] |
15884 | Laws of nature remain the same through any conditions, if the underlying mechanisms are unchanged [Harré] |
15880 | In physical sciences particular observations are ordered, but in biology only the classes are ordered [Harré] |
15869 | Reports of experiments eliminate the experimenter, and present results as the behaviour of nature [Harré] |
15881 | We can save laws from counter-instances by treating the latter as analytic definitions [Harré] |
15882 | Since there are three different dimensions for generalising laws, no one system of logic can cover them [Harré] |
15888 | The grue problem shows that natural kinds are central to science [Harré] |
15887 | 'Grue' introduces a new causal hypothesis - that emeralds can change colour [Harré] |
15889 | It is because ravens are birds that their species and their colour might be connected [Harré] |
15890 | Non-black non-ravens just aren't part of the presuppositions of 'all ravens are black' [Harré] |
15885 | The necessity of Newton's First Law derives from the nature of material things, not from a mechanism [Harré] |
15868 | Idealisation idealises all of a thing's properties, but abstraction leaves some of them out [Harré] |
15886 | Science rests on the principle that nature is a hierarchy of natural kinds [Harré] |
14504 | The Kripke/Putnam approach to natural kind terms seems to give them excessive stability [Koslicki] |
13285 | Natural kinds support inductive inferences, from previous samples to the next one [Koslicki] |
13287 | Concepts for species are either intrinsic structure, or relations like breeding or ancestry [Koslicki] |
13284 | Should vernacular classifications ever be counted as natural kind terms? [Koslicki] |
15864 | Classification is just as important as laws in natural science [Harré] |
15865 | Newton's First Law cannot be demonstrated experimentally, as that needs absence of external forces [Harré] |
15862 | Laws can come from data, from theory, from imagination and concepts, or from procedures [Harré] |
15870 | Are laws of nature about events, or types and universals, or dispositions, or all three? [Harré] |
15871 | Are laws about what has or might happen, or do they also cover all the possibilities? [Harré] |
15876 | Maybe laws of nature are just relations between properties? [Harré] |
15860 | We take it that only necessary happenings could be laws [Harré] |
15867 | Laws describe abstract idealisations, not the actual mess of nature [Harré] |
15872 | Must laws of nature be universal, or could they be local? [Harré] |
15892 | Laws of nature state necessary connections of things, events and properties, based on models of mechanisms [Harré] |
15875 | In counterfactuals we keep substances constant, and imagine new situations for them [Harré] |
13286 | There are apparently no scientific laws concerning biological species [Koslicki] |