31 ideas
21584 | A sense of timelessness is essential to wisdom [Russell] |
21572 | Philosophical disputes are mostly hopeless, because philosophers don't understand each other [Russell] |
21571 | Philosophical systems are interesting, but we now need a more objective scientific philosophy [Russell] |
21574 | Hegel's confusions over 'is' show how vast systems can be built on simple errors [Russell] |
21587 | Philosophers sometimes neglect truth and distort facts to attain a nice system [Russell] |
21582 | Physicists accept particles, points and instants, while pretending they don't do metaphysics [Russell] |
21573 | When problems are analysed properly, they are either logical, or not philosophical at all [Russell] |
21588 | Logic gives the method of research in philosophy [Russell] |
21586 | The logical connectives are not objects, but are formal, and need a context [Russell] |
21585 | The tortoise won't win, because infinite instants don't compose an infinitely long time [Russell] |
4261 | The Lottery Paradox says each ticket is likely to lose, so there probably won't be a winner [Bonjour, by PG] |
21684 | Atomic facts may be inferrable from others, but never from non-atomic facts [Russell] |
22316 | A positive and negative fact have the same constituents; their difference is primitive [Russell] |
21576 | With asymmetrical relations (before/after) the reduction to properties is impossible [Russell] |
21575 | When we attribute a common quality to a group, we can forget the quality and just talk of the group [Russell] |
21580 | Science condemns sense-data and accepts matter, but a logical construction must link them [Russell] |
21583 | When sense-data change, there must be indistinguishable sense-data in the process [Russell] |
21577 | Empirical truths are particular, so general truths need an a priori input of generality [Russell] |
4255 | Externalist theories of knowledge are one species of foundationalism [Bonjour] |
4257 | The big problem for foundationalism is to explain how basic beliefs are possible [Bonjour] |
4256 | The main argument for foundationalism is that all other theories involve a regress leading to scepticism [Bonjour] |
21579 | Objects are treated as real when they connect with other experiences in a normal way [Russell] |
4258 | Extreme externalism says no more justification is required than the truth of the belief [Bonjour] |
4259 | External reliability is not enough, if the internal state of the believer is known to be irrational [Bonjour] |
4260 | Even if there is no obvious irrationality, it may be irrational to base knowledge entirely on external criteria [Bonjour] |
21578 | Global scepticism is irrefutable, but can't replace our other beliefs, and just makes us hesitate [Russell] |
6416 | Other minds seem to exist, because their testimony supports realism about the world [Russell, by Grayling] |
23104 | Dworkin believed we should promote equality, to increase autonomy [Dworkin, by Kekes] |
23257 | We can treat people as equals, or actually treat them equally [Dworkin, by Grayling] |
18621 | Treating people as equals is the one basic value of all plausible political theories [Dworkin, by Kymlicka] |
21581 | We never experience times, but only succession of events [Russell] |