18 ideas
8378 | Philosophers usually learn science from each other, not from science [Russell] |
3745 | Must sentences make statements to qualify for truth? [O'Connor] |
3742 | Beliefs must match facts, but also words must match beliefs [O'Connor] |
3744 | The semantic theory requires sentences as truth-bearers, not propositions [O'Connor] |
3749 | What does 'true in English' mean? [O'Connor] |
3746 | Logic seems to work for unasserted sentences [O'Connor] |
3747 | Events are fast changes which are of interest to us [O'Connor] |
8375 | 'Necessary' is a predicate of a propositional function, saying it is true for all values of its argument [Russell] |
3743 | We can't contemplate our beliefs until we have expressed them [O'Connor] |
3748 | Without language our beliefs are particular and present [O'Connor] |
23104 | Dworkin believed we should promote equality, to increase autonomy [Dworkin, by Kekes] |
23257 | We can treat people as equals, or actually treat them equally [Dworkin, by Grayling] |
18621 | Treating people as equals is the one basic value of all plausible political theories [Dworkin, by Kymlicka] |
4396 | The law of causality is a source of confusion, and should be dropped from philosophy [Russell] |
8376 | If causes are contiguous with events, only the last bit is relevant, or the event's timing is baffling [Russell] |
8380 | Striking a match causes its igniting, even if it sometimes doesn't work [Russell] |
8379 | In causal laws, 'events' must recur, so they have to be universals, not particulars [Russell] |
8381 | The constancy of scientific laws rests on differential equations, not on cause and effect [Russell] |