Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Taking Rights Seriously', 'An Introduction to Modal Logic' and 'Apriority as an Evaluative Notion'

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14 ideas

2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 4. Circularity
9161 Maybe reasonableness requires circular justifications - that is one coherentist view [Field,H]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / b. Terminology of PL
9540 A 'value-assignment' (V) is when to each variable in the set V assigns either the value 1 or the value 0 [Hughes/Cresswell]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / d. Basic theorems of PL
9541 The Law of Transposition says (P→Q) → (¬Q→¬P) [Hughes/Cresswell]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 4. Soundness of PL
9543 The rules preserve validity from the axioms, so no thesis negates any other thesis [Hughes/Cresswell]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
9544 A system is 'weakly' complete if all wffs are derivable, and 'strongly' if theses are maximised [Hughes/Cresswell]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
9160 Lots of propositions are default reasonable, but the a priori ones are empirically indefeasible [Field,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 7. A Priori from Convention
9164 We treat basic rules as if they were indefeasible and a priori, with no interest in counter-evidence [Field,H]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
9165 Reliability only makes a rule reasonable if we place a value on the truth produced by reliable processes [Field,H]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
9162 Believing nothing, or only logical truths, is very reliable, but we want a lot more than that [Field,H]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
9166 People vary in their epistemological standards, and none of them is 'correct' [Field,H]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
9163 If we only use induction to assess induction, it is empirically indefeasible, and hence a priori [Field,H]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
23104 Dworkin believed we should promote equality, to increase autonomy [Dworkin, by Kekes]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
23257 We can treat people as equals, or actually treat them equally [Dworkin, by Grayling]
18621 Treating people as equals is the one basic value of all plausible political theories [Dworkin, by Kymlicka]